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A "GREENING"1 OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION? A CASE COMMENT ON
THE ASBESTOS REPORT2
I. INTRODUCTION
In a landmark ruling, a World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute panel upheld France's ban on imports of chrysotile (or
"white") asbestos from Canada.3 This ruling, the Asbestos
Report, is the first time a panel has allowed a WTO Member to
impose a ban on imported goods pursuant to Article XX(b) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 Article
1. DAVID C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONME.IT, AND THE
FUTURE (1994). This book popularized the phrase "greening the GATT." His book
proposes re-balancing GATT/WTO rules in favor of more deference to national deci-
sion makers about environmental goals and the means chosen to pursue them. See
Douglas J. Caldwell & David A. Wirth, Trade and the Environment: Equilibrium
or Imbalance, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 563, 567-570 (1996) (book review) (discussing
Esty's approach to the trade-environmental dispute). But see Sara Dillon, Trade
and the Environment: A Challenge to the GATT/WTO Principle of "Ever-Freer
Trade," 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 351, 381-82, n. 55 (1996) (disagreeing
with Esty's view that the goals of free trade and the environment are inseparable
and can be accommodated within the GATT and instead arguing that GATT
panels' failure to consider the complexity of-trade's effects on the environment and
other non-trade concerns results in a bias in favor of free trade).
2. WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on European Communi-
ties-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R
(Sept. 18, 2000), http-l/www.wto.orgenglish/tratop-e/dispue/135r-a.e.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Asbestos Report].
3. Daniel Pruzin, Asbestos: WTO Panel Issues Ruling Upholding French ban
of Chrysotile Asbestos, BNA INTL TRADE DAILY, July 26, 2000,
http:J/www.lexis.com.
4. Other attempts to use Article XX(b) of the GATT, though unsuccessful, in-
clude: the Shrimp-Turtle disputes, see WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998),
http-//www.wto.org/english/tratop-eldispu~e58r00.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Re-
port]; WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999),
http'//www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-eldisp-el58abr.pdf [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle AB];
the Tuna-Dolphin disputes, see GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Re-
strictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), 30 I.L.M.
1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I]; GATT Dispute Panel Report on United
States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-
Dolphin II]; and see also GATT Dispute Panel Report on Thailand-Restrictions on
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D.
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XX(b) allows WTO Members to discriminate against or ban
trade if such measures are "necessary" to protect, inter alia,
human health.5 It is also the first time a WTO judgment has
placed non-trade values above "free trade."6
The Asbestos Report has three important implications for
international trade. First, the report demonstrates that the
goal of protecting the environment expressed in the WTO's
Preamble is not mere pretense. Such a demonstration is crucial
to preserve the legitimacy of the WTO. The WTO purports to
be concerned with regulating trade while ameliorating stan-
dards of living and preserving the environment.7 However,
critics believe that the WTO's Preamble is merely pretense,
and that the WTO is only concerned with free trade. Critics
further believe that the WTO's "pro-trade"8 orientation ex-
cludes environmental and health objectives Recently, the
DS10/R37S/200 [hereinafter Thai-Cigarettes].
5. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter GATT],
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 21, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154, at art. XX(b)
(1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures: [hereafter the chapeau] ... (b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health.
6. Geoff Winestock, WTO OK of France's Asbestos Ban May Calm Critics, at
www.ban.org/bannews/wto.html (last visited July 28, 2000). The author defines
"free trade" and "pro-trade" as the notion underlying the negotiating history of the
GATT 1947, or generally as the idea of removing impediments such as tariffs or
non-tariff-barriers which would be a guise for protectionism, such as certain envi-
ronmental legislation.
7. See Preamble to the WTO Agreement, supra note 5:
The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in
the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allow-
ing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve
the environment ...
8. See author's definition, supra note 6.
9. Margaret Graham Tebo, Power Back to the People, ABA JOURNAL, July
2000, at 54-56; see also Virginia Dailey, Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the
Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNA'L L. & POLY 331, 355
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WTO has come under increasing scrutiny." During the pro-
tests of the 1999 meetings of the WTO, the IMF, and the
World Bank in Seattle, environmentalists were among the
most embittered and boisterous." Protesters accused the
WTO of ignoring health and ecological concerns in trade con-
flicts. 12 Some protestors even dressed as sea turtles which
were threatened by the results of the WTO'3 in the Shrimp-
Turtle dispute. 4 The Asbestos Report could help diffuse oppo-
sition to the WTO in environmental circles, and it may help to
affi the WTO's questioned legitimacy among environmental-
ists.
5
Second, Member countries and non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) will try to promote legislation based on the
direction in which they believe the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM) to be headed, perhaps in banning more
trade for human health purposes." Last, and most important,
future disputants will use this report as a basis for trying to
usher in a new era of environmentally and health-friendly
(2000):
The WTO has no ability to reach compromise among competing values, or
even to give non-trade values a 'seat at the table.' Trade agreements shift deci-
sion-making from local democratic bodies to unaccountable global trade bureaucra-
cies that enforce rules largely written by large multinational corporations. Citizens'
ability to govern themselves suffers, along with their environment and standard of
living, when large multinational corporations can write the rules for global com-
merce with no effective accountability.
10. See Tebo, supra note 9, at 54-56.
11. Winestock, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4.
15. Tebo, supra note 9 (discussing that political, environmental and human
rights groups question the legitimacy of the WTO). See also Dan Pruzin & Peter
Menyasz, WTO: WTO Interim Panel Report Said to Find Against Canada in
French Asbestos Case, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, June 14, 2000,
http'J/www.lexis.com ("A ruling in favor of the EU would help repair the WTO's
battered image among green groups and other non-governmental organization,
which have accused the trade body of riding roughshod over national environmen-
tal and public health concerns in the name of free trade.")
16. This is a logical assumption, especially in light of recent research. Global
Trade Watch, a division of the D.C.-based consumer group Public Citizen, has
gathered data showing that many WTO Members are pre-emptively dismantling,
environmental, and health legislation to avoid the political and monetary costs of
defending a law from a WTO challenge. Tebo, supra note 9, at 54 (discussing
WTO's power to usurp countries' own legislative intent to protect the environment
in the context of the "turtle case").
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interpretation of Article XX(b). Accordingly, this panel's ruling
will be essential to understand how the WTO may resolve the
tension between trade and non-trade goals in future dis-
putes.'
Criticism of the GATT/WTO system turns on whether the
current trading system is overly committed to economic effi-
ciency to the detriment of other values, such as the environ-
ment. 8 Previous interpretations of Article XX(b) have high-
lighted how difficult it is to balance environmental and health
concerns and efficient international trade. Over time, the inter-
pretation of Article XX(b) has evolved from a formalistic and
narrow analysis into more of a realistic, balancing approach. 9
However, the reasoning has been fairly formalistic overall prior
to the Asbestos Report. Neither environmental nor health mea-
sures have previously passed muster under Article XX(b) be-
cause they were found to be too trade discriminatory. 0
This Comment suggests that environmentalists and do-
mestic health legislators and organizations should cautiously
welcome the Asbestos Report as a "greening" of the WTO.
Remarkably, the Report found that in order for a proposed
"less-trade-restrictive alternative" measure to render a defend-
ing Member's environmental or health legislation not "neces-
sary" and therefore untenable under Article XX(b), the pro-
posed measure must be "sufficiently effective" in achieving the
defending Member's environmental or health goals.2" This
finding is remarkable as previously, panels and the Appellate
Body (AB) had decided that a Member's measure is not "nec-
essary" for purposes of Article XX(b) if there is a "less-trade-
restrictive alternative" available, even if such measure would
not be reasonably as effective in achieving the Member's envi-
ronmental or health goals.2 In future Article XX(b) disputes,
17. See Pruzin, supra note 3. (reporting that Remi Parmentier, head of po-
litical unit for Greenpeace International, positing that the panel's upholding the
ban would set an important precedent in favor of environmental and public health
concerns, but that it should not be interpreted as a "greening" of the WTO be-
cause asbestos is such an obvious case due to the known scientifically proven
harms, unlike the beef-hormone cases.)
18. Richard J. McLaughlin, Sovereignty, Utility, and Fairness: Using U.S. Tak.
ings Law to Guide the Evolving Utilitarian Balancing Approach to Global Environ-
mental Disputes in the WTO, 78 OR. L. REV. 855, 860 (1999).
19. Id.
20. See all disputes, supra note 4.
21. See Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIH, paras. 8.208-8.210.
22. See Thai-Cigarettes, supra note 4, at VI, paras. 74-75; Tuna-Dolphin II,
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the Asbestos Report's more forgiving interpretation of "neces-
sary" should logically result in more measures meeting the
"necessary" standard and thus being allowed to stand.
Yet, it is possible that this report may prove to be an
anomaly in GATT/WTO jurisprudence as the Asbestos dispute
has very unique facts that future panels and the AB could
easily distinguish.' Unlike asbestos harms, most environmen-
tal and health problems are not as heavily documented.' Al-
so, few commercial products may prove as undisputedly deadly
to humans as asbestos.' Furthermore, it may be difficult to
supra note 4, at V, para. 5.35; Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4, at V, para. 5.27.
23. Although the GATT/WTO dispute resolution system does not possess the
same rationale regarding stare decisis, as the United States' judicial does, there is
still a loose notion of precedent and one can observe in panel and appellate re-
ports both the parties' and arbiters' reliance on previous disputes. See Tuna-Dol-
phin II Report, supra note 4, at HI, para. 3.74 (The European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) and the Netherlands recognized that although there is no stare decisis
in the GATT because there is no hierarchy between courts or arbitral bodies in
the GATT, international courts and tribunals were always careful to maintain
their own precedents and a 'certain coherence' in their decisions. They furthered
argued that the GATT required such coherence in order to provided stability with
the international trading system.). See also Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2,
at paras. 8.74-8.77:
Article XVI:J of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, and para. 1(b)(iv)
of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement,
allow the 'legal history and experience under the GATT 1947 to be
brought into the new WTO. Adopted panel reports 'are an important part
of the GATT acquis.' They create legitimate expectations and among
WTO Members and should thus be taken into account when they are
relevant to any dispute.
Id. The report goes on to allow even unadopted reports to be used for guidance in
reasoning, though the reports bear no legal status.
24. See Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.188 (concluding that
the carcinogenicity of chrysotile fibres has been acknowledged for some time by
international bodies, that it was confirmed by experts gathered by the panel with
respect to both lung cancers and mesotheliomas, and that experts confirmed that
the types of cancer concerned have a mortality rate of close to 100%). See Remi
Parmentier, Greenpeace's Political Director, in World Trade Organisation Still in
Need of Environmental Reform, at http//www.greenpeace.orglpressreleases/
toxics/2000sepl8.html (last visited 9/28/00) (discussing the Asbestos ruling as a
lukewarm indicator of the "greening" of the WTO since asbestos has undisputed
scientific evidence behind it unlike other causes where there is scientific disagree-
ment). See also Winestock, supra note 6.
25. See Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, paras. 8.188, 8.194, 8.196,
8.200-8.201; see id. para. 8.203 ("there is an undeniable public health risk in rela-
tion to the chrysotile contained in high-density chrysotile-cement products"). See
also WTO Tribunal Upholds French Asbestos Ban, But Uses Damaging Reasoning,
2 Harmonization Alert (Sept./Oct. 2000), at
http:/www.tradewatch.org/harmonizationalertSeptOctOO/SepOtOO.
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use this report to support environmental or health measures
that are less controversial than banning asbestos, a highly
toxic product of low trade value.26 Last, normative "morality"
concerns such as the maximization of the human welfare,7
and WTO public relations concerns may arguably have influ-
enced the panel, since the previous narrow reading of the "nec-
essary" standard would likely have dictated a different out-
come.' Thus, future Article XX(b) disputes may ultimately be
decided differently as there may not be such an overwhelming
consensus regarding environmental causes, or even human
health issues where the evidence is less overwhelming than
with asbestos.
As background, Part II of this Comment will discuss the
GATT, the WTO, and its DSM. Part II will also analyze prior
interpretations of Article XX(b). These rulings demonstrate the
tensions between trade and non-trade values and show the
reluctance on the part of panels and the AB to uphold environ-
mental and health regulations at the expense of pro-trade
values. Part HI will summarize the factual background of the
Asbestos Report, the parties' arguments, and the panel's find-
ings. Part IV will analyze the Asbestos Report's interpretation
of Article XX(b). The analysis will suggest that the Asbestos
Report is a big step towards the "greening" of the WTO in that
pdf (last visited 2/15/01) ("In light of the overwhelming evidence of the toxicity
and carcinogenicity of asbestos and the broad public view in numerous countries
that health risks from asbestos are unacceptable, it would have been surprising if
the Panel had dared to overturn the French ban.")
26. See Winestock, supra note 6 (characterizing asbestos trade as a "dying and
discredited industry" and also one of "fairly low international trade value."). How-
ever, though it's of low trade value generally, Canada brought the dispute to the
WTO because although the level of trade of asbestos in France is arguably not
very large, Canada brought action due to "jobs, votes and the fragility of Quebec's
position within the Canadian federation." Also, while the loss of French trade is
not crucial, the possibility that developing nations might adopt the French ban is
since Asia, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria buy the bulk of Canadian chrysotile. See
id.
27. See discussion infra Part II. A. p. 10 (defining "morality reasons" under
the "Liberalism Model" where the consideration of a "normative universal morality
of right and wrong" enter the equation in legal disputes. In this scheme, free
trade is preferable only to the extent that the collective human welfare is maxi-
mized and that domestic social goals are met. This is not the dominate philosophy
of which the WTO was based, however.) See Dailey, supra note 10 (quoting Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 347, 348,
356 (1998).
28. See discussion infra, at V, 42.
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the panel's interpretation of "necessary" under Article XX(b)
should make it easier for a trade measure to survive scrutiny.
However, this analysis will further suggest that the applause
should be cautious as this case is so factually different from
any other prior Article XX(b) dispute that its reasoning may be
confined to its facts in future disputes. Part V will briefly con-
clude. Following Part V is a Postscript which will report and
analyze the recent AB decision in the Asbestos dispute.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the GATT and the WTO
The GATT, opened for signature October 30, 1947, liberal-
ized trade by reducing tariffs at regularly held negotiation
"rounds" held between the contracting parties.29 The GATT
1947 was based on free trade principles and sought to prevent
the introduction of protectionist measures."0 During the Gene-
va-Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1993, 125 countries revised
the GATT 1947 rules and established the WTO.3 ' The WTO
was designed to provide a common institutional framework for
the conduct of trade relations among its Members. 2
The DSM is the cornerstone of the WTO.D The DSM is
one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round, because
the previous procedure of GATT third party dispute resolution
was largely ineffective.3 4 It was ineffective because all dispu-
tants had to consent to the dispute resolution in order to begin
the process, and further because once there was a result, a
disputant could legally refuse to accept it. 35 Moreover, under
29. HAMMOND SUDDARDS SOLICITORS, AN ANATOMY OF THE WTO 2 (Kon
Stantinos Adamantopoulos ed., 1997) [hereinafter Adamantopoulos].
30. Id. at 7, 30.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. JEFFREY S. THOMAS & MICHAEL A. MEYER, THE NEW RULES OF GLOBAL
TRADE: A GUIDE TO WTO 308 (1997). See also Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, su-
pra note 5, Annex 2, art. 111:2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 21; 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), [hereinafter Understanding] ("the dispute
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and pre-
dictability to the multilateral system").
34. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 33, at 308.
35. Id. See also J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplo-
mats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settle-
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the old system, individual Member states that were not part of
the dispute could block adverse panel decisions."s Now, the
system has a more recognizable "legal" framework.17 There is
compulsory adjudication when a Member brings a complaint to
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the outcomes are
binding." Unlike under the GATT 1947,"9 the panel's report
is automatically adopted unless a unanimous decision by all
WTO Members, including the winning party, opts not to
adopt.4" Furthermore, in contrast to the old system, there is
now a reviewing court, the AB, which further legalizes the sys-
tem.4 Losing Members must comply with the ruling and if
winning Members are dissatisfied with the compliance, or lack
thereof, they can seek compensation or retaliation.42 In short,
the DSM represents the "teeth" of the WTO, because its Mem-
bers have consented to use the DSM and not to take unilateral
ment, HARV. JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPERS (2000), at I, p. 1,
http'//www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers00/000901.html.
36. Dillon, supra note 1, at 375.
37. Id.
38. Weiler, supra note 35, at 1.
39. The GATT 1947 and 1994 are functionally equivalent as the 1947 was
subsumed as an annex-Annex IA-to the WTO Agreement. It is this annexed
GATT that is termed the GATT 1994. The only difference is that with the GATT
1994, the WTO and the DSB have power to compel compliance with panel deci-
sions. See Dillon, supra note 1, at n. 1.
40. Understanding, supra note 33, at art. 16.4, 17.14, at 417-18, 33 I.L.M.
1224.
41. But see Weiler, supra note 35, at IV, p. 7 (criticizing the AB for not
grasping that one of its tasks is to be the "custodian of the entire judicial element
of dispute settlement and that it has an institutional responsibility towards ...
the Panels. It should be the task of the AB to socialize, institutionalize and valo-
rize the work of panels" instead of often issuing scathing reviews.) For an inter-
esting discussion of the philosophical evolution of the DSM, see PIERRE PESCATORE
ET AL, HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, Release #10, Vol. 1 (June
2000). Over the evolution of the DSM there was tension between the U.S. and
Canada (and most developing and non-European countries) who wanted the system
to be more legalistic-protecting the rights of small countries and pressuring the
offending party to conform to the code-versus European countries and Japan who
wanted a more pragmatic structure focusing on negotiation and consensus. A legal-
istic GATT would promote decisions on the merits and effective implementation of
decisions whereas a less intrusive GATT calls for using the dispute mechanism
only to facilitate a negotiated settlement. See also THOMAS & MEYER, supra note
35, at 311 (discussing how the U.S. and Canada wanted a system akin to a do-
mestic court which does not have a consensus requirement versus Europe and
Japan which wanted to continue the diplomatic nature of Articles XXII and XXIII
of the GATT 1947).
42. Terence P. Stewart & Amy Ann Karpel, Part I: Review of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, 31 LAW & POLY INTL BUS. 593, 596 (2000).
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The DSB administers the "Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" (Under-
standing) and is authorized to establish dispute settlement
panels, adopt reports, oversee implementation of rulings and
recommendations, and authorize the suspension of concessions
and of other obligations.' The most important provision of
the Understanding for grasping the mind-set of the panelists
and of the AB is Article 3. It states that the DSB's purpose is
to "provid[e] security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system" and "to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements."45 Article 3 also
states: "[rlecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the cov-
ered agreements."46 The need for predictability and security in
inter-state relations could account for panels' and the AB's
reluctance to allow non-trade measures to affect and diminish
trade efficiency. If Members can introduce conservation or
health measures often enough under the exception to Members'
obligations under Article XX of the GATT, then the "pro-trade
goal"47 of the GATT may be compromised.48 The DSM's pro-
trade orientation is a factor in every Article XX(b) dispute.
This pro-trade orientation stems from Article 34' Thus, at the
outset of any dispute resolution, the scale is tipped towards
trade and away from non-trade values pursuant to Article 3.o
43. THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 33, at 22, 24.
44. Id. at 313.
45. Understanding, supra note 33, at arts. 3:1, 2.
46. Id.
47. The author defines "pro-trade goals" as "free trade" e.g. minimizing barri-
ers (tariff and non-tariff) to international trade. "Pro-trade" here can also be seen
under the "Economic Efficiency Model." See Discussion infra II.A, at 11-12.
48. Of course, this contention depends on how one characterizes the "pro-trade
goal" of the GATT. If one considers that goal to include the WTO's Preamble on
"sustainable developmenf (see Preamble, supra note 7), then this contention would
not be as convincing. However, the author is referring to just the GATT and not
the Preamble. But even if the author was referring to both the GATT and the
Preamble, practically speaking, regardless of the "sustainable development" concept
in the Preamble, it is evident throughout the panel and AB reports that Article
XX should be used very sparingly or else free trade could be often and easily
compromised.
49. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 865.
50. Assuming non-trade values-e.g. environmental justice-are de-stabilizing
and unpredictable (since a Member state can create domestic legislation at any
2001] 1797
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Moreover, the WTO's binding dispute mechanism can now
ensure those pro-trade values by narrowly construing the Arti-
cle XX exceptions, at the expense of environmental justice and
the collective human welfare." Before the binding dispute
mechanism, a Member who had a domestic environmental or
health law could continue to enforce that law, even if other
Members objected, or if there was a dispute resolution against
the domestic legislation. However, now with the binding dis-
pute mechanism, the GATT/WTO arbiters can and have forced
Members to change their domestic environmental and health
policies to comport with the GATT's pro-trade goals.52
The environmentally conscious Preamble to the WTO,
which was not present in the GATT 1947, is also important.53
It may not be equally important since the Preamble is not
binding, as are the positive obligations in the GATT. Neverthe-
less, because panels and the AB often cite to and sometimes
even feature the Preamble in its analysis of a dispute, most
notably in Shrimp-Turtle AB, the Preamble is pertinent to
time), and if the Understanding's purpose is to provide "security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system," it logically follows that arbiters of the Under-
standing will be loathe to allow Members to use the non-trade values in Article
XX(b). See also Dillon, supra note 1, at 378, 382 (1996) (arguing that the GATT
system is ill equipped to deal with national environmental or health laws because,
inter alia, "the main thrust of thinking can never be other than in favor of ever-
increasing free trade because in panels trying to avoid national laws having pro-
tectionist implications, which most will, they will end of avoiding "protectionism,"
even at the cost of environmental and labor standards.)
51. Of course, this contention is relative to how one views the WTO's trade
values. Under the "Economic Efficiency Model," the only way to ensure non-trade
values is to have unhindered trade which will promote wealth which will in turn
allow for those wealthier countries to implement expensive environmental legisla-
tion, for example. However, this author challenges that model. See id. at 352-353,
355 (1996) (arguing that although a 1992 GAT Secretariat report provides official
support for the notion that increased trade liberalization will generate the wealth
necessary to allow environmentally sound production methods, this is not the only
way to protect the environment, and in fact, might thwart environmental protec-
tion as "by its nature ever-expanding international trade is accelerating the degra-
dation of our global environmental as a whole.")
52. See, e.g., Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4.
53. See Preamble to WTO, supra note 7. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at
VI, para. 152 (discussing that the GATT 1947 Preamble promoting the "full use of
the resources of the world," had to be changed to the current Preamble which
"allow[s] for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objec-
tive of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environ-
ment. . . ." as the 1947 version was no longer appropriate to the world trading
system of the 1990s). In drafting the WTO Preamble, the drafters used the GATT
1947 Preamble as a model but changed it to reflect environmental concerns.
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Article XX(b) interpretation.' The Preamble states that WTO
Members should: "[expand] the production of and trade in
goods... while allowing for the optimal use of the world's re-
sources in accordance with the objective of sustainable develop-
ment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environ-
ment ... ."' The addition of environmentally conscious lan-
guage in 1995 represents a shift in environmental awareness,
at least on paper. Moreover, with the current binding dispute
mechanism, there is now the means for panels and the AB to
enforce the environmental-trade balance, albeit there is no
positive requirement for these bodies to do so or for the Mem-
bers to follow the Preamble on their own.56 Yet, although the
Preamble seemingly harmonizes trade and environmen-
tal/human welfare concerns, in practice, there has been tension
between the two theories that has spurred the contentious
debate between environmentalists and pro-trade organizations.
The predominant philosophy on which the WTO is based
has been termed the "Economic Efficiency Model."57 This mod-
el claims that the efficiency and economic growth that comes
with free trade will increase the "collective welfare"58 by in-
creasing production, enhancing the availability of goods, and
reducing consumer prices.59 It also claims that only trade lib-
eralism, and not environmental legislation, will truly generate
the requisite wealth that will permit environmentally friendly
production methods to be implemented, especially in poorer
third-world countries. 0 This theory appraises trade barriers
as "inefficient intrusions into otherwise autonomously fimction-
ing markets [that] tend to divert resources from their most
highly valued uses" and result in market losses.6'
54. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4, at para 6.2; Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra
note 4, at VI, para. 152.
55. Preamble to the WTO Agreement, supra note 7. (emphasis added)
56. The WTO Preamble does not give Members positive obligations like the
"national treatment principle" and has been criticized as being largely ineffective
in promoting non-trade values because the language "sustainable development" is
so vague. See Dillon, supra note 1, at 371.
57. Dailey, supra note 9, at 350.
58. The author defines "collective welfare" as including production process
methods (PPMs), such as negative externalities of trade like child labor or a soot
blowing factory, and not as limited to the economic collective welfare.
59. Dailey, supra note 9, at 350-351.
60. Dillon, supra note 1, at 352-53.
61. Dailey, supra note 9, at 348 (quoting Dunoff, supra note 27, at 348).
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In stark contrast, the coveted "Liberalism Model" of inter-
national environmentalists espouses that the "primary goal of
the WTO should be to lower trade barriers to the extent that
trade policies do not violate certain domestic social policies."62
Unlike the "Economic Efficiency Model," the "Liberalism Mod-
el" subscribes to a "normative universal morality of right and
wrong" and in doing so accommodates non-trade values such as
the environment.63
One scholar, Virginia Dailey, has recently argued that
"sustainable development," and not economic efficiency, should
be the overarching principle of the WTO and constitute an
"express obligation" for every WTO Member.' She reasons
that the principle of "sustainable development" has been recog-
nized as part of customary international law, and as such,
should be infused into the interpretation of Article XX(b) and
its chapeau, or introductory preamble.65 According to scholars,
"sustainable development" includes obligations to (1) consider
the needs 6f present and future generations; (2) accept limits
on the use of natural resources for environmental protection
reasons; (3) apply equity in the allocation of rights and obli-
gations; and (4) integrate all aspects of the environment with
development.66 However, instead of a being a potent non-trade
force in the GATT/WTO regime, "sustainable development"
remains an elusive concept since the term is so vague. Because
it is highly debatable what level of "development" is actually
"sustainable" this term cannot be applied as a legal test.67
62. Id. at 351 (quoting Dunoff, supra note 28, at 356).
63. Id. (quoting Dunoff, supra note 27, at 356).
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id. at 334-343. She explains that "sustainable development has become
customary by looking to: (1) state action and opinio juris; (2) Multilateral Envi-
ronmental Agreements (MEA's) like, inter alia, the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the
1989 Basel Convention; (3) other International legal documents like the 1972
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment; and (4) two recent judicial decisions by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) have recognized sustainable development as party of customary international
law. See Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Progject (Hung. V. Slovk.), Sept. 25,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 162, 200-1, §140 (1998). See also Request for an Examination of
the Situation in Accordance with Para. 63 of Court's Judgment of 20 Dec. 1974 in
the Nuclear Tests, (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Sept. 22, 1995).
66. Dailey, supra note 9, at 345.
67. Dillon, supra note 1, at 371. See also Caldwell and Wirth, supra note 1,
at 585, 586 ("sustainable development" is defined as development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising future generations' ability to meet their
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B. The Interpretive Evolution of Article XX(b) of the GATT
The GATT/WTO system establishes three fundamental
principles in order to effect free international trade." First,
Article I requires "most favored nation treatment" among its
Members, meaning that Members must not discriminate
against "like products" from any other Member and must treat
all such products identically.69 Second, Article III, known as
the "national treatment" principle, dictates that Members must
apply taxes and regulations no less favorably to imported prod-
ucts than domestic products.70 Third, Article XI limits quanti-
tative import restrictions to duties, taxes, or other charges, and
generally prohibits quotas, import prohibitions and export
prohibitions.7
Article XX lists general exceptions to these fundamental
GATT articles. For purposes of this Comment, the essential
language of Article XX is the chapeau,72 and subsection (b).
They read respectively:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures: [hereafter the chapeau] ... (b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
73
The established method of interpretation of Article XX(b) and
needs, yet as a concept is "somewhat indeterminate.")
68. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 865.
69. See GATr, supra note 5.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures.
Id.
73. Id. at art. XX.
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the chapeau is a three-step analysis.74 First, panels must de-
termine whether the controverted measure is to "protect hu-
man, animal, or plant life or health." Second, panels must
assess whether the measure is "necessary" for the protection.
Third, if the measure is necessary, then the panel analyzes the
measure under the chapeau to determine if the "necessary"
measure is nevertheless "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail," or "a disguised restriction on trade." If the necessary
measure is neither arbitrary, unjustifiable nor a disguised
restriction, then the measure is allowed to stand.
The drafting history and subsequent interpretation of the
Article XX's chapeau and the Article itself reveal a fear of the
exception's potential to undermine the principle of free trade
since Members may create protectionist barriers under the
guise of environmental and health protection policies.75 To
prevent such abuse of the Article XX exceptions, panels have
construed Article XX as a limited and conditional exception
from obligations under other GATT provisions, and not as a
positive rule establishing obligations in and of itself.6 Indeed,
the chapeau was specifically adopted to ensure that such abuse
would not occur.77 This concern for the vulnerability of trade
values influences the panel and AB decisions under
GATT/WTO dispute resolution.
1. Traditional Doctrinalism: Pre-WTO Disputes
The interpretation of Article XX(b) of the GATT, from its
drafting in 1947 to the WTO's DSM, manifests a grave concern
with protecting exporting countries against protectionist retali-
ation under the guise of "health concerns," specifically by nar-
74. See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 4; Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4.
75. WTO, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 5622 (1995).
76. Id. This sentence refers to the panel report on United States-Section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 [hereinafter Tariff Act], 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345,
385, para. 5.9.
77. See Thai-Cigarettes, supra note 4, at 56, n. 7 (discussing the Netherlands
and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union's concerns during the draft ITO Char-
ter during the London session of the Preparatory Committee that "Indirect protec-
tion is an undesirable and dangerous phenomenon ... Many times the stipula-
tions 'to protect animal or plant life or health' are misused for indirect protection.
It is recommended to insert a clause which prohibits expressly [the use of] such
measures [to] constitute an indirect protection.. ..")
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rowly interpreting "necessary." Before the WTO was estab-
lished, the exceptions in Article XX were construed quite nar-
rowly.78 This partly accounts for the absence of any reports al-
lowing a country to discriminate against trade based on Article
XX(b). This traditional, narrow construction of Article XX ex-
ceptions promotes free trade over the other societal values. 9
Early panels viewed 0 free trade as the primary means to
stimulate economic growth and efficiency, which they believed
was an essential prerequisite to environmental protection.8 '
Thus, panels failed to balance the environmental or health
risks of abandoning the environmental/health measure against
the level of detrimental economic impact, if any, of such mea-
sure on the targeted nation(s).82
Several reports illustrate this narrow interpretation of
Article' XX(b) and failure to balance the risks against the bene-
fits. The Thailand-Cigarettes Panel (Thai-Cigarettes)' held
that a Thai measure banning the importation of tobacco prod-
ucts, including cigarettes, except those by government licence,
was not "necessary" to protect their citizens' health." Thai-
land sought to protect its nationals' health by ensuring the
quality and reduce the quantity of cigarettes sold.' The gov-
ernment argued that the only way it could control smoking
was to ban imports, including U.S. cigarettes, which were
believed more harmful than Thai cigarettes. The Thai-Ciga-
78. WTO, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 562 (1995).
See also Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.75 (discussing the
relevance of reports adopted by panels under the GATT 1947 as significant, allow-
ing the "legal history and experience" of it to be brought into the WTO. They are
an "important part of GATT acquis" and "create legitimate expectations among
WTO Members and should be taken account when they are relevant to any dis-
pute.")
79. The Article XX exceptions to the pro-trade GATT rules reflect concern
with other non-trade values like environmental justice and human and animal
health. By panels and the AB limiting the use of these exceptions, naturally free
trade will face less impediments, such as environmental domestic legislation.
80. See author's definition of "free trade," supra note 6.
81. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 870
82. Id. at 870-871.
83. Thai-Cigarettes, supra note 4.
84. Id. at II, paras. 6, 8. The regulation in question was section 27 of the
Tobacco Act, 1966. Licenses had only been granted to the Thai Tobacco Monopoly,
which had imported cigarettes on only three occasions since 1966, namely in 1968-
70, 1976, and 1980.
85. Id. at IV, para. 76.
86. Id. at III, para. 14 (discussing that Thailand believed that due to chemi-
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rettes Panel held that the Thai health measure was not "neces-
sary" under the "least-trade-restrictive-alternative" analysis."
Under this analysis, a defending Member "is bound to use,
among the measures reasonably available to it, that which en-
tails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provi-
sions."88 Under this analysis, the panel reasoned that a Thai
policy requiring complete disclosure of cigarettes' ingredients,
coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances and on cigarette
advertising, is the "least-GATT-inconsistent" alternative, thus
rendering the Thai measure untenable under the GATT.
Of particular relevance, is that this panel used precedent
interpreting "necessary" in paragraph (d) of Article XX to inter-
pret paragraph (b) of the same article.89 It saw no reason why
under Article XX, the meaning of "necessary" would not have
the same meaning in paragraph (d) as (b).9" This is now the
established analysis.9' Nevertheless, it is illogical. Paragraph
(d) concerns the protection of patents and trademarks92 and
paragraph (b) concerns health issues. The different context
justifies a different interpretation of the term "necessary." An
alternative interpretation for Article XX(b) would require a
"reasonableness" standard, such as "reasonably" necessary.
One scholar, Thomas Shoenbaum, contends that the traditional
interpretation of "necessary" is erroneous.93 He argues that
because the grammar and syntax of Article XX(b) makes it
clear that the purpose of the clause is to protect living things,
the "least-trade-restrictive-alternative" requirement subverts
this purpose by changing the meaning instead to protect
cals and other additives indicative of U.S. cigarettes, those cigarettes were more
harmful to one's health than Thai cigarettes.).
87. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 868; Dailey, supra note 9, at 376.
88. Thai-Cigarettes, supra note 4, at VI paras. 74-75 (the note to this para-
graph refers to the Tariff Act, supra note 76 at para 5.26.).
89. Tariff Act, supra note 76.
90. Thai-Cigarettes, supra note 4.
91. See Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4; Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4; Tuna-
Dolphin II, supra note 4.
92. GATT, supra note 5, at art. XX(d):
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relat-
ing to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated un-
der paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents,
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.
93. See McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 870-71.
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against measures impeding free trade. 4 This author agrees
with Shoenbaum's analysis and would further add that the
"least-trade-restrictive analysis" would only comport with the
purpose of Article XX(b) if the purposed alternative was just as
effective or almost as effective as the measure at issue in pro-
tecting the environment or health.
Tuna-Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin Il" provide additional
examples of interpretive formalism. The Tuna-Dolphin I dis-
pute occurred when the U.S. imposed an embargo on Mexican
tuna until the U.S. Secretary made findings as to Mexico's
incidental dolphin kill rates?6 The measure was the U.S. Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).97 Its purpose
was to greatly reduce the incidental killing or serious injury of
dolphins in the course of commercial fishing by prohibiting the
taking and importation of marine mammals, unless an excep-
tion was explicitly authorized." Two species of the many spe-
cies of dolphin at issue were the eastern spinner and coastal
spotted, which are listed in the Convention of International
94. Id; see this Comment's author's definition of "free trade," supra note 6.
95. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4; Tuna-Dolphin H, supra note 4.
96. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4, at para. 2.7. See id. at para 2.6. Section
101(a)(2)(B) of the MMPA provides that as a prerequisite for finding that another
country has comparable incidental taking rates and a similar harvesting regulatory
regime, the average incidental taking rate must not exceed 1.25 times the average
taking rate of the U.S. vessels in the same period. Also, the'share of Eastern
spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin relative to total incidental takings of
dolphin during each year must not exceed 15% respectively. Therefore, the Secre-
tary was trying to find whether the percentage of Eastern spinner dolphins killed
by the Mexican fleet over the course of an entire fishing season did not exceed
15% of all dolphins killed by it in that period.
97. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 1361-
1421h (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
98. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4, at para. 2.4 (explaining that MMPA autho-
rized limited incidental taking of marine mammals by U.S. fishermen in the
course of commercial fishing pursuant to a permit issued by the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of the Department of Commerce). The MMPA does not prohibit or regu-
late the sale of tuna caught by the U.S. although it provides for forfeiture of cargo
as a penalty for violation of its regulations on harvesting tuna. See also id. at
para. 2.5. The Act provides that the importation of tuna harvested with purse
seine nets in the Eastern Tropical Pacific ("ETP") and products therefrom is pro-
hibited unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that (i) the government of the
harvesting country has a program regulating taking of marine mammals that is
comparable to that of the U.S., and (ii) the average rate of incidental taking of
marine mammals by vessels of the harvesting nation sis comparable the average
rate of such taking by U.S. vessels.
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Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES).99
The panel held that the U.S. measure was not "necessary"
because the U.S. had not demonstrated that it had exhausted
alternative measures, such as negotiation of international
cooperative agreements.' 0 The Tuna-Dolphin I Panel began
its analysis by recalling that Article XX was a "limited and
conditional exception from obligations under... GATT," and
so had a history of being narrowly construed.'' The panel
then applied the "least-trade-restrictive-alternative" analy-
sis.' °2 Under this analysis, the panel determined that even if
Article XX(b) permitted Members to protect animal life outside
of their domestic jurisdiction, which it did not,0 3 the measure
would not be "necessary" because the U.S. had not demonstrat-
ed that it had "exhausted all options reasonably available to
it," including negotiation of international cooperative arrange-
ments.
10 4
However, the panel did not take into account the practical
reality that negotiations are time-consuming. The environ-
ment, animal life and human life can all be irreparably
harmed as time passes.0 5 For instance, one scholar has re-
99. Id. at paras. 2.10, 3.14.
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 5.22.
102. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4, at V para. 5.27.
103. See id. at para. 5.22-5.29. The panel decided that although the text did
not recognize jurisdictional boundaries, its drafting history did, although such
boundaries were stricken from the final version. The panel further reasoned that a
broad, boarderless interpretation of Article XX(b) would jeopardize the multilateral
framework of the GATT, because a Member could then utilize Article XX(b) to
unilaterally determine the environmental or health policies of other Members. Id.
104. Tuna I Report, supra note 4, at paras. 5.24-5.29. The panel noted that
even if an embargo was "necessary," the particular measure in question was not
"necessary." This is because Mexico had to meet the U.S. taking rate, yet could
not predict what it would be beforehand, so that at any given time, Mexico could
not know if their policies conformed to the U.S. dolphin protection standards.
105. Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article XX of
GATT and the Trade and Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. INtL & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1999) (discussing implication of AB's strong suggestion that interna-
tional negotiations precede the imposition of environmental trade measures being
an impediment to environmental, protection because such negotiations will prevent
WTO Members from acting quickly and unilaterally to protect the environment).
See also National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Breaking News: WTO Appellate Body
Strikes Down U.S. Turtle Protection for the Last Time, at
http://www.nwf.org/nwf/intemational/trade/turtles/wtofinal.html (visited Aug. 24,
1999) (commenting on the Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, quoted in, Neuling, at 43):
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ported that "the world is losing between 27,000 and 150,000
species per year, approximately seventy-four species every day,
and three every hour [and] up to seventy percent of the world's
fisheries are depleted or under stress after years of over-exploi-
tation." °6 This concern is especially pertinent in the case of
the eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin, which
are on the endangered species list.1°7 Yet, even for the dol-
phin species that are not endangered, a similar concern applies
because if dolphins continue to be maimed or killed in tuna
purse seines then their numbers could become seriously deplet-
ed to the point where they may be put on the endangered spe-
cies list. In short, Tuna-Dolphin I shows the preeminence of
trade values at the expense of environmental values.
Therefore, the panel's acknowledgment of the WTO's Preamble
rang hollow when it stated: " ... . that the provisions of the
GATT impose few constraints on a contracting party's imple-
mentation of domestic environmental policies."08
Tuna-Dolphin II, a related dispute, involved the "interme-
diary nation embargo," an aspect of the MMPA prohibiting
tuna imports from countries that imported tuna from third
nations that harvested tuna through the incidental taking of
dolphins.0 9 The panel found the U.S. measure not "neces-
Sometimes it is impossible to negotiated with all countries when
trying to protect a species on the verge of extinction. Sometimes timing
or political situation necessitate that one country take the lead in pro-
moting comprehensive environmental protections. Although they did it
imperfectly, the U.S. Government made a good faith effort to protect
endangeked sea turtles around the world from death in shrimp nets.
While efforts by one country are not enough, and are not the ideal solu-
tion to international environmental problems, sometimes, in cases such as
this one where an entire life form is threatened, they are necessary.
Id.
106. Daily, supra note 9, at 332, (citing Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Humng. V. Slovk.), Sept. 25, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 162, 206 (1998).
107. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 4, at para. 3.23; See also William J. Snape,
III, Biodiversity and the Law: An Introduction, 8 TUL. ENVT'L. L.J. 5, 12 (1994)
(reporting that the problematic relationship between environmental law and inter-
national trade is particularly severe in the areas of marine biodiversity due to,
inter alia, over-fishing).
108. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 4, at para. 6.2.
109. Id. at II, para. 2.12. Any intermediary nation that exports yellowfin tuna
or such products to the U.S. and that imports the same from countries that are
subject to a direct prohibition on import into the U.S. must certify and provide
reasonable proof that it has not imported products subject to the direct prohibition
within the preceding six months. See also id. at V, para. 5.5. Subsequent to the
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sary" under the "least-restrictive-trade-alternative.""0 Specif-
ically, the panel reasoned that because the regulation was only
effective if it succeeded in "coercing" the intermediary nations
to adopt the U.S. policy within their own jurisdictions instead
of having a direct conservation or protective effect on the envi-
ronment, the measure could not be "necessary."' Such rea-
soning equates "necessary" with "directly affecting," which is
not contemplated by the language or negotiating history of
Article XX(b)." Also, the panel's reasoning tends to under-
mine any environmental or health legislation as the purpose of
such legislation is often an attempt to force other countries to
change their ways. Therefore, Tuna-Dolphin II narrowed the
interpretive landscape of "necessary" to measures which "di-
rectly affect" the legislated environmental or health problem,
and to measures which do not impinge on a state's sovereignty.
The panel's analysis of the necessity of the conservation
measure impermissibly rendered Article XX(b) obsolete. The
panel reasoned that a measure "forc[ing] other countries to
change their policies within their own jurisdictions""' cannot
be "necessary" and thus allowable under GATT because such a
policy would seriously impair GATT's free trade objective."'
The panel feared that if Article XX(b) were construed to allow
Members to deviate from their basic obligations under GATT
by internationalizing their domestic conservation policies at
the expense of free trade, free trade would no longer be possi-
ble. However, the panel turned the analysis upside-down by
inserting the broad consideration of GATT's overall purpose
into the discrete and specific interpretation of "necessary"
entry into force of the new provision of the MMPA dated Oct. 26, 1992 that pro-
vided certification by reasonable proof by the intermediary nation that it has not
imported products subject to the direct prohibition within the preceding six
months, France, the Netherlands and the UK were withdrawn from the list. Costa
Rica, Italy, Japan and Spain remained on the list.
110. Id. at V, para. 5.35.
111. Id. at V, para. 5.38.
112. See generally WTO, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL IN-
DEX 5622 (1995). But see Neuling, supra note 105, at 15 (concluding that, in the
final analysis, the negotiating history of Article XX may not have had much bear-
ing on the Article's interpretation, although paragraphs (b) and (g) were probably
written for non-environmental reasons, and not intended to create a broad environ-
mental exception in GATT. Its conscription into this unnatural role leaves it an
ineffective tool for achieving environmental objectives.)
113. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 4, at V, para. 5.38.
114. Id. at V, para. 5.39.
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under Article XX(b). In essence, it performed the chapeau anal-
ysis-is the measure unjustifiably discriminatory-before first
determining, in the absence of trade concerns, whether a mea-
sure to protect life or health was necessary to protect that life
or that health."'
The question the panel should have addressed, but did not,
was whether the measure was "needed" or "indispensable" to
save the dolphins, regardless of whether the broader GATT
trade objectives would be impaired. Since Article XX(b) is an
exception to the GATT's pro-trade agenda, necessarily any
measure allowed under its "necessary" standard will appear to
be in conflict with Members' positive obligations under the
GATT 1947. However, such conflict is legal in the GATT re-gime under the Article XX exceptions. Therefore, the panel
should have first evaluated the health measure under the
"necessary" standard in the Article, without concern as to
whether the measure would impair GATT pro-trade objectives.
Then, if the measure is "necessary," the panel can then deter-
mine under the standards in the chapeau if the "necessary"
measure is nevertheless "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion," which by implication would upset the GATT's agenda by
abusing the limited exceptions in Article XX for protectionist
ends. Thus, a panel that initially determines under a "neces-
sary" analysis whether or not a measure conflicts with the
GATT's broad purpose of reducing trade barriers will in fact
render the exception obsolete.
Notably, Tuna-Dolphin II implied in dictum that Article
XX(b) may allow Members to pursue environmental protection
measures outside their jurisdiction. This represents a complete
turn-around from the finding in Tuna-Dolphin I which rejected
such measures as "unilateral" and "jeopardizing the multilater-
al framework of GATT." This dictum indicates the WTO's po-
tential willingness to be less rigid in its Article XX(b) analysis,
allowing for future use of this provision for global environmen-
tal protection.
Nevertheless, in sum, these three panel reports made it
very difficult for an environmental or health measure to fit
within the very narrow confines of the "necessary" require-
ment. These early GATT decisions employed "doctrinal rigidi-
115. See Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4.
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ty" in their interpretations because the underlying concern and
belief was that free trade should be the only legitimate val-
ue."' There was no attempt to perform a cost-benefit analy-
sis, balancing the benefit of the domestic policy with the detri-
ment to international trade."' Thus, after the Tuna cases, no
GATT Member has relied on justifying its actions solely under
Article XX(b), until the Asbestos Report."'
2. Towards a Less-Rigid, Balancing Approach: Post-WTO
Disputes
After establishing the WTO in 1995, dispute panels adopt-
ed a more balanced approach to interpreting Article XX, weigh-
ing the costs to the international trading system against the
benefits to the environment."9 First, the WTO dispute set-
tlement system went from being non-binding to binding. Sec-
ond, a permanent AB was established that reviewed errors of
law. Third, there was a consensus among the most powerful
Members of the WTO that international environmental protec-
tion must be recognized by the trade organization as a legiti-
mate area of concern. 20
However, the first Article XX(b) dispute after establishing
the WTO suffered from pre-WTO "doctrinalism." The Shrimp-
Turtle Panel Report (Shrimp-Turtle) illustrates "traditional
doctrinalism" at its, worst.' The panel not-so-subtly implied
116. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 871 (explaining that such pro-trade senti-
ment was unsurprising since GATT's Secretariat had traditionally wielded power
in the formulation of individual panel decisions). Since the goal of the GATT 1947
is to reduce restrictions on free trade, the Secretariat, as a champion of the
GATT, would wish to keep the trade restrictions to a minimum, and thus domestic
environmental legislation as it tends to impose restrictions on free trade.
117. Id. (citing GATT Doc. TREW1/Rev.1 (Oct. 14, 1993)) (Report on Trade and
the Environment published by the GATT Secretariat identified 19 international
environmental agreements that provide for some kind of trade restrictions).
118. Dailey, supra note 9, at 378. Instead, Members relied on Article XX(g)
because the AB has been more flexible in interpreting it and the standard is easi-
er to satisfy. See GATT, supra note 5. Article XX(g) reads "relating to the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
119. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 874. The AB was established as a perma-
nent body and it remedied the problems characteristic of earlier panels by inter-
preting the WTO pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, and promoted a more detailed legal analysis.
120. Id. at 888.
121. Id. at 878.
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that the highest goal under GATT/WTO dispute resolution is
maintaining the status quo of the multilateral trading system,
even at the expense of the environment. 122 It accomplished
this by determining that it was not crucial to examine the U.S.
trade measure, Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 (Section
609), because it "could put the multilateral trading system at
risk.""2 The panel went so far as to opine that trade mea-
sures that jeopardize the multilateral trading system are in-
herently impermissible under Article XX of the GATT
1994.'2A Yet, in contrast to this reasoning, the WTO's Pream-
ble says that trade must be expanded with "the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve
the environment."" This language necessarily suggests a
compromise between trade and the environment. However,
Shrimp-Turtle treated the Preamble as mere pretense and
refused to try to balance the benefits of liberalizing trade
against the harms to the environment.26
Section 609 required the U.S. Secretary of State to initiate
negotiations for the development of agreements for the protec-
tion of sea turtles.'27 It also provided that shrimp harvested
with technology that might harm sea turtles protected under
U.S. law cannot be imported into the U.S., unless the harvest-
ing country has a regulatory program, comparable to the U.S.,
governing the incidental taking of such sea turtles. 28 A regu-
latory program must include a requirement that shrimp har-
vesters use turtle excluder devices (TEDs), where there is a
likelihood of intercepting sea turtles.'29
122. Id.
123. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 4, at para. 7.60.
124. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 4, at para. 7.16.
125. Preamble to the WTO Agreement, supra note 7.
126. See Tebo, supra note 9 (describing the events at the November 1999 con-
ference between the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in Seattle).
127. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 4, at VII, para. 3. Enacted in 1989, revised in
1996. This Act was meant to encourage negotiations, in particular, with countries
engaged in commercial fishing operations likely to harm sea turtles.
128. Id. at VII, para. 3. The President must annually certify to Congress that
other countries have similar regulatory program regarding sea turtles as does the
U.S. The U.S. theory is that if the regulatory program vis a vis protecting sea
turtles is the same, presumably the rate of incidental takings of sea turtles will
be the same.
129. Id. at VII, para. 5. The TEDs must be comparable in effectiveness to
those used by the U.S. The average incidental taking rate will be deemed compa-
rable to that of the U.S. the harvesting country requires the use of TEDs in a
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The panel interpreted the chapeau in light of the GATT
1994 and the WTO Agreement as a whole.30 The panel found
that the "central" object and purpose of the WTO Agreement,
of which the GATT is a part, was to eliminate discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations and to promote eco-
nomic development through trade."1 Accordingly, the panel
held that the chapeau of Article XX, interpreted in the light of
the object and purpose of the GATT and of the WTO, only
allows Members to derogate from the GATT provisions if such
derogation does not undermine the multilateral trading sys-
tem.'32 The panel concluded that Section 609 was not valid
because the measure's efficacy depended on the U.S. forcing
other counties to change their conservation policies, which in
turn posed a threat to the security and predictability of the
multilateral trading system. 3
On appeal, the U.S. argued that Shrimp-Turtle erred in
applying a novel and unfounded test for determining whether
the measure was "unjustifiable discrimination" under the cha-
peau. " ' That test was "whether the measure on its own un-
dermines the WTO multilateral trading system, [and] also
whether such type of measure, if it were to be adopted by other
Members, would threaten the security and predictability of the
multilateral trading system."'35 The U.S. contended that to
reduce chapeau analysis to excluding measures which resulted
in "reduced market access" or "discriminatory treatment"
would turn the analysis into a mere tautology, erasing the
exception under Article XX. 36
The Shrimp-Turtle AB agreed with the U.S. It found that
the panel failed to examine the plain language meaning of the
chapeau, which was concerned with the "manner of applica-
manner comparable to that of the U.S. program. Turtles get caught in the devices
used to catch shrimp, and subsequently they die. Thus, the TEDs help save the
lives of sea turtles.
130. Id. at VII, para. 35.
131. Id. at VII, para. 42.
132. Id. at VII, para. 44.
133. Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 4, at VII para. 44.
134. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at I, para. 1.
135. Id. at para. 7.44.
136. Id. at I, para. 15. See also id. at I, para. 16 ("it is legal error to jump
from the observation that the GATT is a trade agreement to the conclusion that
trade concerns must prevail over all other concerns in all situations arising under
GATT rules.").
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tion." Instead, it focused on the measure's "design."37 The
Shrimp-Turtle AB noted that the report also erred in looking
to the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement instead of just the chapeau. 13 Last, the Shrimp-
Turtle AB chastised the panel for analyzing the U.S. measure
under the chapeau before it analyzed the measure under the
actual exception.19 This method of interpretation was inap-
posite to the established method of analyzing the exceptions
first, then the chapeau.'4 ° In order for a measure to fail un-
der the chapeau, it must be arbitrarily or unjustifiably discrim-
inatory, not merely inconsistent with one of the substantive
obligation so the GATT."
The Shrimp-Turtle AB's greatest accomplishment was its
inauguration of the balancing approach which accounts for the
environmentally-conscious negotiating history of the WTO's
Preamble and its importance in dispute resolution.' The AB
stated: "this preambular language reflects the intentions of
negotiators of the WTO Agreement, [so] we believe it must add
color, texture and shading to our interpretation of the ... the
GATT."' This consideration ushered in the new "bafancing
137. Id. at VI, para. 115. The AB said, "[flor instance, the panel stressed that
it was addressing 'a particular situation where a Member has taken unilateral
measures which, by their nature, could put the multilateral trading system at
risk."
138.- Id. at VI, para. 116 (discussing that in mistakenly looking to the object
and purpose of the GATT/WTO Agreement as a whole, which possess the very
broad purpose of maintaining the multilateral trading system, the panel developed
an overly broad interpretation of the chapeau-which, arguably no Article XX ex-
ception could overcome).
139. Id. at VI, para. 117.
140. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at VI, para. 118-119.
The analysis is two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason
of characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal
of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX. The
sequence of steps indication above in the analysis of a claim of justifica-
tion under Article XX reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but
rather the fundamental structure and logic of Article XX.
Id.
141. Id. at VI, para. 150. See id, n. 138 ("In United States-Gasoline, we stat-
ed: 'The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s)
by which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have oc-
curred.'").
142. Id. at VI, para. 152.
143. Id. at VI, para. 153.
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approach:"'
[We consider that [the chapeau] embodies the recog-
nition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a
balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Mem-
ber to invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article
XX... and the substantive rights of the other Members
under the GATT 1994. Exercise by one Member of its right to
invoke an exception... if abused or misused, will, to that
extent, erode or render naught the substantive treaty
rights... of other Members. Similarly, because the GATT
1994 itself makes available the exceptions of Article XX, in
recognition of the legitimate nature of the policies and inter-
ests their embodied, the right to invoke one of those excep-
tions is not to be rendered illusory... thus, a balance must
be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an excep-
tion under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to
respect the treaty rights of the other Members. 4 ' (Empha-
sis in original.)
Based on this new balancing approach, the inquiry under the
chapeau is now to locate the equilibrium between the two
interests, which must be done on a case-by-case, fact-intensive
basis.'46
However, the measure did not survive the chapeau analy-
sis for three reasons. First, the U.S. impermissibly imposed a
"single, rigid and unbending requirement" that countries ap-
plying for certification under Section 609 adopt a comprehen-
sive regulatory program that is essentially the same as the
U.S. program, without inquiring into the appropriateness of
the program for the conditions prevailing in the exporting
countries. The AB stated its obligation to assess whether the
"application" of a measure may be characterized as "amounting
to an abuse or misuse of an exception of Article XX," either in
its effect or intentionally on the measure's face.'4 7 Because
144. McLaughlin, supra note 18.
145. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at VI, para. 156.
146. Id. at VI, para. 159. The AB said, "[the task of interpreting and applying
the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating the marking out a
line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under
Article XX and the rights of other Members under varying substantive provisions."
Id. The AB further stated that this line of equilibrium is "not fixed and unchang-
ing [but] . . . moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and
as the facts making up specific cases differ." Id.
147. Id. at VI, para. 160 (explaining that the standards of the chapeau include
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Section 609 conditioned trade upon non-U.S. Members' adop-
tion of what would essentially be a sea-turtle conservation
policy identical to U.S. policy and not merely comparable, al-
lowing no flexibility, the AB found that the measure's applica-
tion has the effect of unjustifiable discrimination.14 s The AB
further remarked that in international trade relations, it is
unacceptable for one Member to condition trade relations upon
other Members adopting essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory program, without taking into consideration different
conditions which may occur in the territories of those other
Members. 49
Second, the U.S.' failure to negotiate with other Members
with the objective of concluding agreements for the protection
and conservation of sea turtles also proved decisive.'50 The
AB reasoned that since the U.S. has signed the Inter-American
Convention, which provides that each party shall take "appro-
priate and necessary measures" for the protection of sea turtles
and that parties shall act in accordance with the WTO, the
U.S. thereby acknowledged that consensual and multilateral
procedures are feasible. Therefore, the AB concluded that the
Convention was a "convincing demonstration" that an alterna-
tive course of action was "reasonably open" to the U.S. for
securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure. 5' The AB
believed that since the U.S. negotiated seriously with some,
but not other Members (including the appellees: India, Paki-
stan, and Thailand) the measure was "plainly discriminatory"
and "unjustifiable."'52 The AB seemed to establish a per se
rule against unilateral trade measures without first attempt-
ing to negotiate a solution, 5 3 requiring a Member to engage
substantive and procedural requirements).
148. Id. at VI, para. 161. See also id. at paras. 161-162 (explaining that the
application is 'unjustified discrimination' because the rules under Section 609 es-
tablishes a rigid and unbending standard by which the U.S. determines certifica-
tion of other countries). Furthermore, other policies and measures that an export-
ing country may have adopted for the protection and conservation of sea turtle are
not taken into account, by the administrators making the comparability determina-
tion. See id.
149. Id. at V, para. 164.
150. Id. at V, para. 166.
151. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at V, para. 169-171. The signatories to
the Inter-American Conferences were Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, the
U.S. and Venezuela.
152. Id. at V, para. 172.
153. The AB emphasized that the unilateral character of the application of
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in "serious, across-the-board negotiations" before imposing
trade regulations."M This is both unfair and unwise as negoti-
ations can drag on for a long time while the animal life in
question becomes irreparably damaged and the species dwindle
toward extinction, harming biodiversity.'55 Indeed, extinction
is real danger for sea-turtles, which are on the endangered
species list.'56 Moreover, the AB failed to provide any guid-
ance regarding what constitutes "serious, across-the-board
negotiations."'57
Third, the AB found that Section 609 also constituted
"arbitrary discrimination" for the same reasons that it consti-
tuted "unjustifiable discrimination, " "' and because Section
609's certification process was neither transparent nor predict-
able. The U.S. system lacked due process because an applicant
country could neither be heard nor respond to the findings of
U.S. officials by filing an appeal. Also, there was no formal,
reasoned decision why certification would be denied.'59 Thus,
although this new balancing approach is a groundbreaking
advance toward allowing Article XX exceptions, the Shrimp-
Turtle AB did relatively little to lower the WTO/GATT's fairly
high bar of scrutiny of domestic environmental and health
legislation.
III. THE ASBESTOS PANEL REPORT
A. Facts
On December 24, 1996, the Prime Minister of France
banned asbestos by Decree No. 96-1133 (Decree), 60 acting
Section 609-that the details of the policies are dictated by the U.S. Department
of State without the participation of other Members and certification is decided by
the U.S. alone-"heightens the disruptive and discriminatory influence of the im-
port prohibition and underscores its unjustiflability." Id.
154. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at V, para. 173.
155. See Discussion infra Part B.1, at 18-19.
156. See Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at I, para. 25.
157. McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 888.
158. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at V, para. 177.
159. Id. at V, paras. 180-81.
160. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at II, paras. 2.1-2.2 (discussing asbestos as
a "fibrous mineral of hydrated silicates" which can be either amphiboles or serpen-
tine. Chrysotile or white asbestos falls within the latter group.). Asbestos is ex-
ploited for industrial and commercial purposes because their special quali-
ties-resistance to very high heat and to different types of chemicals-have allowed
them to be used for many uses, including the manufacture of industrial and con-
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pursuant to the domestic Labor Code and the Consumer
Code.' The relevant provisions of the Decree are Article 1:I
and 1:II:
I. For the purpose of protecting workers, and pursuant to
Article L. 231-7 of the Labour Code, the manufacture, pro-
cessing, sale, import, placing on the domestic market and
transfer under any title whatsoever of all varieties of asbes-
tos fibres shall be prohibited, regardless of whether these
substances have been incorporated into materials, products or
devices.
II. For the purpose of protecting consumers, and pursu-
ant to Article L. 221.3 of the Consumer Code, the manufac-
ture, import, domestic marketing, exportation, possession for
sale, offer, sale and transfer under any title whatsoever of all
varieties of asbestos fibres or any product containing asbestos
fibres shall be prohibited."
This Decree is designed to protect against health hazards iden-
tified in a study by France's National Institute for Health and
Medical Research (INSERM).113 The study concluded that
chrysotile asbestos is a carcinogenic which poses a health
threat to the general public."6 Before the ban, France annu-
ally imported 20,000 to 40,000 tons of white asbestos and prod-
ucts containing it. 6 ' Canada is the second largest producer
and the world's leading exporter of white asbestos, which is
used in underground pipes, shingles and friction products, such
as brake linings, disc brakes and clutch pads. In 1995, Canada
exported 30,000 metric tons of asbestos to France, its biggest
European customer.'66 The EU stated that approximately
2,000 people in France die each year from cancer caused by
sumer products and in the building industry. Id.
161. Id. at VIII, para. 8.1. See also id. at 395 n. 1 (describing "asbestos" as all
varieties of asbestos without distinction, though the only asbestos referred to by
Canada is chrysotile asbestos.) The Consumer Code can be found at OFFICIAL
JOURNAL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC of 26 December 1996.
162. Id. at VIII, para. 8.1. The full text of the Decree is attached to the report
as Annex I. The other Articles mentioned in the report involve limited exceptions
on a temporary basis, from the ban, under certain circumstances involving certain
existing materials where no substitute exists. The Decree entered into force on
January 1, 1997.
163. Id. at III, para. 3.11.
164. Id.
165. Id. at III, para. 3.8.
166. Pruzin, supra note 3.
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asbestos exposure.'67
Canada initiated the dispute concerning the Decree with
the European Communities (EC),"s on May 28, 1998, by re-
questing consultations with the EC pursuant to Article XXII of
the GATT 1994.169 Since the consultations failed to resolve
the dispute, Canada requested the DSB to establish a panel to
examine the French statute.'7 Canada claimed that the De-
cree was inconsistent with Articles III and XI of the GATT,
among other provisions.' On November 28, 1998, the DSB
established a panel. 2 The panel submitted its final report to
the parties on July 25, 2000, and distributed it publicly on
September 18, 2000.'
B. Arguments of the Parties
Canada made four arguments regarding the safety of
white asbestos. First, Canada argued that chrysotile asbestos
should be allowed because it is less dangerous than amphibole
asbestos, which is the most dangerous form of asbestos. 4
Second, Canada contended chrysotile fibres can be used with-
out incurring any detectable risk, because these fibres are
encapsulated in a modern, inert matrix.75 Third, Canada ar-
gued that the adoption of effective methods for reducing dust
creation and controlled use are sufficient health-protection
167. Id.
168. The EC is the body with exclusive jurisdiction in international trade mat-
ter for Member States, of which France is a Member.
169. Asbestos Report, supra note 2.
170. Id. at I, para. 1.1-1.2. The date was October 8, 1998.
171. Id. at I, para 1.2. Canada also claimed the Decree was inconsistent with
Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT, because it nullified or impaired one or several
advantages accruing to Canada directly or indirectly under the WTO Agreement or
impeded the attainment of an objective of the Agreement. As well, Canada claimed
that the Decree conflicted with Articles 2 and 5 of the Sanitary Phytosanitary
Agreement (SPS), and Article 2 of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement
(TBT).
172. Id. at I, para. 1.3.
173. Id. at VII, para. 7.1. See also id. at I, para. 1.7 (explaining that the panel
was unable to present its report within the six-month period provided in Article
12.8 of the Understanding as more time was needed to complete its report). See
also the Understanding, supra note 33 (pursuant to the Procedures for the Circula-
tion and De-restriction of WTO Documents, the report was made public).
174. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at III, para. 3.9.
175. Id. at III, para. 3.9.
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guarantees."6 Fourth, Canada contended that France could
control the use of white asbestos to minimize the health risk in
three cases requiring particular vigilance: (1) the presence and
elimination of old asbestos products in buildings; (2) the demo-
lition of buildings containing significant amounts of asbestos;
and (3) the elimination of asbestos waste.' For example,
France could require the use of special tools to cut asbestos-
filled products that nearly eliminate emissions, such as low-
speed saws with water injection and masks for the operators,
to guarantee safety.7 ' Also, Canada accused the French Gov-
ernment of using the ban to protect its domestic manufacturers
of substitute products, which INSERM admits have unknown
human health risks, and to assuage public opinion and anti-
asbestos activists.7 9
The EC countered with four arguments. First, the EC
contended that although Canada correctly stated that amphi-
boles asbestos is more hazardous than chrysotile asbestos in
contracting mesothelioma, experts contend that the two types
are equally likely to cause lung cancer.' Second, the EC em-
phasized that most of the substitutes for asbestos have been
used regularly without any detectable risk.'8' Third, counter-
ing Canada's charge of protectionism, the EC pointed out that
France largely imports the substitute products from other
countries.'82 Fourth, regarding Canada's suggestion that con-
trolled use could be a remedy, the EC maintained that con-
trolled use does not account for the regular servicing and
maintenance work carried out by people who may be unaware
of whether the material on which they are working contains
asbestos."S "Para-occupationals" and do-it-yourself (DIY) en-
thusiasts have an extremely high risk of exposure." 4 Addi-
tionally, the EC points to other countries that have banned the
176. Id. at III, para. 3.9.
177. Id. at III, para. 3.55.
178. Id. at III, para. 3.56.
179. Id. at III, paras. 3.10-3.11
180. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at III, para. 3.18.
181. Id. at III, para. 3.18.
182. Id. at III, para. 3.19.
183. Id. at III, para. 3.19.
184. Id. at III, para. 3.59, 3.65. Para-occupational users would be those in
building, metalworking and shipbuilding, where asbestos products are used but not
the asbestos itself and domestic use would be the general population when en-
gaged in "do-it-yourself activities.
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use of chrysotile asbestos as proof that its act is not an irratio-
nal one arising out of a response to public pressure." 5 These
countries include, among others: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Sweden,
Austria, and the Czech Republic. 8 '
The parties also made several legal arguments regarding
the applicability of Article XX(b). The EC maintained that
because asbestos is a proven hazard to human health, the
Decree is the only way to halt the spread of risk and reduce
deaths among the French population.'87 The EC argued that
so-called "safe" use is unable to halt the spread of risks from
exposure to asbestos in production and processing, even though
the number of people involved is relatively small and easy to
manage. Also, "safe" use is completely ineffective in cases of
occasional exposure to asbestos.'88 The EC explained that
there is no other way to protect the general population of DIY
individuals who are unaware of the risks.189
Canada asserted that the current uses of chrysotile in
high-density, non-friable"9 products do not constitute a de-
tectable risk to human health, and that the only detectable
risk is from amphiboles and friable materials which are associ-
ated with past uses of asbestos. Canada further contended that
the EC incorrectly cited the risk of building maintenance work-
ers (such as, electricians, plumbers, sheet metal workers and
boiler-makers) because their risk is from friable materials that
often contain amphiboles of high pathogenic potential.'9 ' Al-
so, Canada claimed that the EC exaggerated the risk to DIY
enthusiasts, because these exposures would usually be to fria-
ble materials containing amphiboles which cannot be eliminat-
ed by the Decree.'92 Thus, the Decree is not "necessary" to
protect human life or health. However, in the event that the
185. Id. at I, paras. 3.31-3.32.
186. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at I, para. 3.32.
187. Id. at III, para. 3.477.
188. Id. at III, para. 3.485. The principle of "safe" use cannot be applied to the
risks affecting a wide range of jobs involving an enormous variety of situations,
especially in servicing and maintenance. These workers may only be exposed to
asbestos occasionally, but they are subject to exposure peaks that sometimes far
exceed the currently accepted dust thresholds.
189. Id. at III, para. 3.486.
190. Those materials are easily crumbled, and more fragile.
191. Id. at III, para. 3.494.
192. Id. at III, para. 3.495.
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panel finds chrysotile to be a threat, Canada contended that
controlled use is a less-restrictive-alternative, which eliminates
the risks just as effectively.'93
C. Findings of the Panel
After concluding that the Decree violated Article III of the
GATT 1994, the "national treatment" principle, the panel
applied Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to the Decree. The
panel first examined whether the measure fell within the scope
of Article XX(b), and then considered whether its application
satisfied the conditions of the chapeau.'95 Article XX(b) states
that the measure must be "necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health."'96 The panel explained that in order
for the Decree to fall under Article XX(b), it had to be designed
to "protect" human life or health and be "necessary" to fulfil
the policy objective."7 The threshold issue was whether
chrysotile asbestos posed a risk to human life or health, be-
cause if they did not, there would be nothing to "protect."
98
The panel stated that the EC must show the level of protection
France wished to achieve. Last, the panel considered the exis-
193. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at III, para. 3.496.
194. Id. at VIII, para. 8.86. Article III:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Id. See also id. at VII paras. 8.129-8.130 (allowing the risk of a product for hu-
man or animal health to be a factor of comparison for "like products" within the
meaning of Article III would render Article XX(b) superfluous). Moreover, a Mem-
ber could thus avoid the "necessary" test in Article XX(b) and the further test in
the chapeau, thus circumventing the built-in protections against protectionism and
leaving the WTO vulnerable. But see Daniel Pruzin & Peter Menyasz, Environ-
mental Groups Criticize WTO Ruling on Asbestos Ban, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY,
Sept. 20, 2000, http:J/www.lexis.com. Three environmental groups criticize the
panel's finding as "setting dangerous precedent," because the panel's finding that
the Canadian chrysotile-fibre products and less dangerous substitutes like cellulose,
glass fibers, and an asbestos-cement substitute were "like" products under Article
III:4 of the GATT may prevent governments from distinguishing between toxic and
non-toxic products. Id. For an interesting criticism of the panel's interpretation of
"like products," see HARMONIZATION ALERT, supra note 25.
195. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.167.
196. GATT, supra note 5.
197. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.167.
198. Id. at VIII, para. 8.170.
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tence of other measures consistent or less inconsistent with the
GATT which still facilitate the Decree's objective. 9' On the
facts of this case, since the parties disputed the existence and
extent of the health problem, the panel had to rule on the
extent of the health problem."0 The panel stated that if it
concluded that the health hazard was less than the EC alleged,
"less vigorous" measures may have been justified.20 '
To conduct its inquiry, the panel had to make a pragmatic
assessment of the scientific situation and the measures avail-
able. This assessment is similar to the decision that French
lawmakers had to make when adopting the health policy.0 2
Accordingly, while the panel did not articulate any specific
standard of review for local determination on health issues, the
panel was fairly deferential to the local French authorities.
The panel held that, based on the long-time international ac-
knowledgment of the carcinogenicity of chrysotile fibres and
the confirmation by the experts consulted in the matter, the
handling of chrysotile-cement products constituted a risk to
human health.0 ' The carcinogenicity was confirmed by the
experts consulted by the panel,"4 and the types of cancer
concerned had a mortality rate of close to 100%."' According-
ly, a decision maker responsible for public health measures
"might reasonably find" that chrysotile-cement products posed
risks."' Therefore, the panel concluded that the Decree fell
within the range of policies contemplated by Article XX(b).
To determine whether the Decree was "necessary," the
panel applied the "least-trade-restrictive-alternative" definition
199. Id. at VIII, para. 8.179.
200. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.173, 8.176.
201. Id.
202. Id. at VII, para. 8.183 (citing the Reformulated Gasoline Report, para.
6.20). See also id. at paras. 8.181-8.182 (explaining panel's role as not to settle a
scientific debate between experts, but rather to determine whether there is suffi-
cient scientific evidence to conclude that there exists a risk for human life or
health and that the measures are in fact necessary in relation to the objectives
pursued). Pursuant to Article 13.1 of the Understanding, the Asbestos Panel con-
sulted scientific experts.
203. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, at paras. 8.188-8.193. Both the
World Health Organization and the International Agency for Research on Cancer,
among other international bodies, have long recognized the carcinogenicity of as-
bestos. Id. at VIII, at para. 8.188, n.135.
204. Id. at VIII, para. 8.188.
205. Id. at VIII, para. 8.188.
206. Id. at VIII, para. 8.193.
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of "necessary" with a new "sufficiently effective" element.07
The panel determined that controlled use was not a "reason-
able alternative" to the Decree as it was not "sufficiently effec-
tive" in light of France's health policy objectives.2 8 Although
some countries, like the U.S. and Canada, utilized controlled
use, the experts demonstrated that its efficacy remains elusive.
Moreover, although controlled use could be applied in mining
and manufacturing, it is more difficult to utilize the strategy in
the building sector,2 9 not to mention other extremely varied
circumstances of use like the DIY enthusiasts.210 On this ba-
sis, the panel concluded that in view of the "difficulties of ap-
plication," an official making public health policy might "rea-
sonably" consider that "controlled use" did not provide protec-
tion that was adequate in relation to the policy objectives.2 '
Furthermore, the panel stated that the continued marketing of
products containing chrysotile asbestos would multiply the
likelihood that workers could be exposed to concentrations in
asbestos linked to pathologies in humans. Therefore, even if
exposure rates are low, the multiplication of sources of expo-
sure may lead to concentrations already found to have caused
the disease.2'
The panel additionally found Canada's claim, that the
Decree is not necessary because the substitute products are of
unknown risk, to be without merit.' 3 The panel stated that
the World Health Organization (WHO) as well as the experts
consulted by the panel confirmed that the substitute fibres did
not present the same risk to health as chrysotile. Moreover,
the panel reasoned that it did not have to wait to use the sub-
stitute fibres until a degree of certainty equivalent to that
which exists with respect to chrysotile had been established as
that would result in "preventing any possibility of legislating
207. Id. at VIII, para. 8.208.
208. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.217, 8.222.
209. See Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.213 (reasoning that
because of the mobility of building sector workers and their sometimes inadequate
training, as well as the large number of sites and therefore of people liable to
exposure, it is difficult to impose sophisticated occupational safety practices on this
sector).
210. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.207, 8.211, 8.214.
211. Id. at VIII, para. 8.209.
212. Id- at VIII, para. 8.216.
213. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.218-8.221.
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in the field of public health."214
As a matter of first impression, the panel defined "reason-
ably necessary" as what is "legitimate" in terms of the "eco-
nomic and administrative realities facing the Member con-
cerned but also by taking into account the fact that the State
must provide itself with the means of implementing its poli-
cies." In linking the "reasonably necessary" standard to the
economic and administrative capabilities of the defending
Member, the panel emphatically and repeatedly stressed that
the standard is a "reasonable" one and that the "least-trade-
restrictive-alternative" standard should be read according-
ly.215 The panel found that as a developed country, France
was able to "deploy administrative resources proportionate to
its public health objective and to be prepared to incur the nec-
essary expenditure"216 so as to comport with its positive obli-
gations under the GATT. The panel reached this conclusion
because France possessed the advanced labor legislation and
the specialized administrative services to deploy administrative
resources proportionate to its public health objectives." 7 This
means that France, because it is a developed and prosperous
nation, could not claim that another, "less-trade-restrictive
alternative" that was similar in effectiveness was not feasible
since France with its advanced labor legislation and specialized
administrative services could afford to employ that appropriate
funds.
Next, the panel applied the measure to the chapeau of
Article XX(b). The chapeau states that so long as measures in
Article XX are not applied "in a manner which would consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or "a
214. Id. at VIH, para. 8.221.
215. See Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.207:
A contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with
another GATT provision as 'necessary' in terms of Articles XX(d) if an
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATr provisions is available to it.
By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other
GATT provision is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound
to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails
the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions. [Emphasis
in original.]
Id.
216. Id. at VIII, para. 8.207.
217. Id. at VIII, para. 8.207.
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disguised restriction on international trade" they comport with
the GATT.21 The panel stated that the determination into
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" could not logically
refer to the same standard by which a violation of a substan-
tive rule had been determined to have occurred, which here
would be Article III.219 Rather, it referred to whether all sup-
pliers of asbestos, whether domestic or foreign, are treated
similarly.22 The panel held that Canada failed to rebut the
presumption that the Decree does not discriminate under the
chapeau established by the prima facie case made by the
EC.22' The panel noted that despite the neutral language of
the Decree that does not differentiate asbestos on the basis of
origin, if France treated Canadian asbestos less favorably than
imports from other countries, the chapeau would be violated
under Article 3:II of the Decree.2 Article 3:II provides in
relevant part, in conjunction with Article 2:1-II, that the Minis-
ters for Labor, Consumption, Industry and Agriculture can use
their discretion to discriminate against an operator qualifying
for an exception to the ban who imports chrysotile fibres from
Canada.2' However, since Canada had not argued this, and
since this had not been the case, the panel did not consider
this contention.2
The panel also held that the Decree did not constitute a
"disguised restriction on international trade."2  After noting
that the actual scope of this phrase had not been clearly de-
fined, the panel went on to conclude that since the Decree did
not amount to "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination,"
neither did it amount to a "disguised restriction."2 6 The pan-
el also focused on the word "disguised" to conclude that "a
restriction which formally meets the requirement of Article
XX(b) will constitute an abuse if such compliance is in fact only
218. GATT, supra note 5.
219. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.227.
220. Id. at VIII, para. 8.227.
221. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.228-8.229.
222. Id. at VIII, para. 8.228.
223. Id. at VIII, para 8.1.
224. Id. at VIII, para. 8.1.
225. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.231.
226. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.235-8.237. The panel based its finding on the Refor-
mulated Gasoline Appellate Report which stated that the former inquiry can be
taken into account in considering the latter.
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a disguise to conceal the pursuit of trade restrictive objec-
tives."22 ' Using the standard in the Japan-Alcoholic Beverag-
es Appellate Report,2" the panel reasoned that since the aim
of a measure may be difficult to divine, protectionism can most
often be discerned from the measure's "design, architecture
and revealing structure."'29 However, the panel found noth-
ing offensive in the Decree's design, architecture and revealing
structure."0 The panel ended its analysis by acknowledging
the possibility that measures such as those in the Decree
might have the "effect" of favoring the domestic substitutes,
but that this cannot justify the conclusion that the measure
has a protectionist aim." I Thus, the panel finally held that
the Decree satisfied the conditions of Article XX(b) and the
chapeau.
In light of the findings of the Asbestos Panel, the state of
current GATT/WTO jurisprudence on Article XX(b) of the
GATT 1994 seems to be as follows: (1) State health officials
will enjoy some deference under a "reasonable" standard in
their decisions on the existence and extent of health problems;
(2) any proposed "least-restrictive-trade-alternative" must be
"sufficiently effective" as the measure at issue to be considered
a "reasonable alternative" to the measure at issue; (3) what is
a "reasonable alternative" will also be determined in terms of
the economic and administrative situation facing the particular
Member; and (4) a State can employ the use of substitute prod-
ucts that are less dangerous than the banned product, even if
the risks of that substitute are less well-known than those of
the banned product. All four aspects mentioned are novel con-
siderations in an Article XX(b) analysis. Of course, as with
many cases in the U.S. domestic judicial system, we often have
to wait until subsequent cases cite to and utilize prior decided
cases to find out what the cases in fact stand for.
227. Id. at VIII, para. 8.236.
228. WTO Appellate Body Report of Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8; DS10; DS1I/AP/R (1996).
229. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.236.
230. Id. at VIII, paras. 8.238-8.239.
231. Id. at VIII, para. 8.239.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Environmentalists and public health observers should be
optimistic after the Asbestos Report. It is the first environmen-
tal or health dispute where a measure taken under Article
XX(b) was found "necessary." It is also the first environmental
or health dispute under the GATT to survive the chapeau's
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" standard. The panel
implicitly acknowledged the WTO Preamble's "sustainable
development" principle based on the "Liberalism Model" which
values human health and environmental concerns as equal to
free trade.
However, environmentalists and public health observers
should be cautious in their enthusiasm as it is not clear that
the result here will control future Article XX(b) disputes. The
Asbestos Report leaves three questions unanswered which
could compromise the "greening" of the WTO. First, because
the dangers of asbestos are so well documented, it is not clear
whether the benchmark for proving a measure is "necessary" is
now unreachably high or even whether there is a specific
threshold. Second, because the asbestos industry has a low
trade value,"2 it is not clear if the panel's conclusion would
have been different if the industry had a high trade value.
Third, it is unclear whether the panel was driven by moral or
equitable concerns under the "Liberalism Model,""3 because
the issue posed grave danger to human health. Future panels
may not be so forgiving if the "health" or "life" at stake is "ani-
mal" or if the purpose is environment conservation.
Optimistically, the Asbestos Report interprets "necessary"
more pragmatically and flexibly than in past disputes. Also,
the report seems to grant considerable deference to domestic
law makers in choosing health-inspired trade regulations. In
determining whether the asbestos ban was necessary, the
panel concluded that a law maker could "reasonably" conclude
that "controlled use," a "least-trade-restrictive-alternative," was
an inadequate substitute.234 Additionally, the panel paid def-
232. See Discussion infra I (especially notes 24-27).
233. See Discussion infra Part II.A., at 12.
234. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.209; but see John 0.
McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary: The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 596 (Dec. 2000) (arguing that, even though the Asbestos
Panel's loosening of the "least-trade-restrictive-alternative" requirement is positive,
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erence to France's choice of requiring substitute products even
when the level of risk associated with those products is not
clear, at least when less dangerous than a product like asbes-
tos. 5 This latter development is important in suggesting
that when a substitute measure's potential for harm is not
completely clear, the panelists will defer to the Member coun-
try in light of its needs to carry out health legislation. Such
deference is new to GATT/WTO jurisprudence.
In a related point, the panel suggests that the WTO will
not use the "least-trade-restrictive" requirement to hamstring
poor developing countries into implementing very expensive
regulatory programs common in the developed world. 6 By
defining "reasonably necessary" in relation to the "economic
and administrative realities" of the defending State, the panel
implicitly seems to acknowledge that the "least-trade-restric-
tive-alternative" must be a more relative and flexible determi-
nation vis a vis poorer WTO Members. However, the "reason-
ably necessary" standard seems to be a double-edged sword for
developing countries. In ruling that France must "deploy ad-
ministrative resources proportionate to its public health objec-
tives and to be prepared to incur the necessary expendi-
tures,"27 the panel seems to suggest that Members, including
developing countries, will be expected to devote as much re-
sources as they can relative to their wealth to the structuring
of a WTO/GATT friendly domestic policy."8 If this is the case,
developing country Members will not be able to decide for
themselves what proportion of their resources to spend on
domestic environmental and health policies.
Most groundbreaking, is the panel's interpretation of the
"least-trade-restrictive-alternative" as an alternative which
must be "sufficiently effective" in light of the domestic health
policy. This new analysis is quite pragmatic, accounting for
contingencies and the realistic improbability of implementing
alternatives, e.g. controlled use, to the necessary degree to
accomplish the Member's legislative goal, e.g., zero asbestos
the WTO should go even firther to give even more deference to national regula-
tory agencies; otherwise panelists would have the ability to substitute their own
views for the views of the national authorities).
235. Asbestos Report, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.221.
236. McGinnis & Movesian, supra note 234, at 595.
237. Asbestos Panel, supra note 2, at VIII, para. 8.207.
238. McGinnis & Movesian, supra note 234, at 595.
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exposure and risk. Additionally, this analysis cedes to Mem-
bers more domestic autonomy in how to structure measures to
effect environmental and health goals.
Prior to the Asbestos dispute, many scholars criticized the
"least-trade-restrictive alternative" standard in the "necessity"
analysis.' 9 These scholars claimed, and the author agrees,
that the prior interpretation of "necessary" was problematic.
The interpretation was problematic because it failed to require
proposed alternative measures to be of substantially equivalent
effectiveness in achieving the particular environmental or
health goal, instead of being markedly inferior." Unlike past
reports, the Asbestos Report seems to have infused "sufficient-
ly effective" or perhaps, arguably, "almost equally effective"
into the equation, thus accommodating the notion that alterna-
tives must be almost equally effective in terms of their Article
XX(b) goal. If this new "sufficiently effective" standard had
been applied in past environmental disputes, the trade restric-
tions would likely have been allowed to stand. 1
For instance, in the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle
disputes, where the panels and the AB found that the U.S.'s
failure to negotiate rendered the conservation measure "not
necessary," this new "sufficiently effective" standard may have
changed the outcome. In applying the more forgiving "suffi-
ciently effective" standard, the panel and AB would likely have
recognized that the negotiation of international agreements
take precious time during which irreparable harm can be done
to the dolphin population in general as it contributes to
biodiversity and the equilibrium of the environment." This
reasoning would likely have proved especially persuasive to the
panel and AB when applied to the endangered eastern spinner
239. See., e.g., Dailey, supra note 9, at 376; McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 870-
1 (citing Thomas Shoenbaum, International and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 284-313 (1997)). See
also id. (citing Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ and
Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INTL L. 1043 (1994)).
240. See Dailey, supra note 9, at 376; McLaughlin, supra note 18, at 870-1
(citing Shoenbaum, supra 239, at 284-313).
241. Dailey, supra note 9, at 377-78 (arguing that if the "least-trade-restrictive-
alternative" were reformed to ensure a "substantially as effective" standard in
achieving environmental protection, than the bar would be lowered to allow more
measures under Article XX(b), and would have specifically "drastically change[d]
the outcome in every one of the environmental cases hears in the GATT thus far).
242. See Discussion infra Part II.B, at 18-19.
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and coastal spotted dolphins and the endangered sea turtles.
Thus, negotiation may have been assessed as not being a "rea-
sonably available" alternative to unilateral action."
Nevertheless, the Asbestos Report should not necessarily
be hailed as an unequivocal "greening" of the WTO. It is not
clear that the result here will control future Article XX(b)
disputes for three reasons. First, because the dangers of asbes-
tos are so well-documented," it is not clear whether the
benchmark for proving a measure is "necessary" is set
unreachably high or even whether there is a specific threshold.
Medical evidence and statistical data on the deadly health
risks of asbestos have been building up for decades, and so the
dangers are well documented."5 As one legal expert, Sam Zia
Zarifi, said: "In effect, by accepting a ban on asbestos (a prod-
uct with a fairly low international trade value), the WTO could
discourage bans on other products whose hazards are not as
well known as asbestos." 6
Second, the measure at issue is non-controversial. There is
not much at stake in terms of economic efficiency in trade,
whereas there is much at stake with regard to the aggregate
human welfare. The asbestos industry is a largely a "discredit-
ed and dying industry." 7 Particularly with this case, the
facts show that not much is at stake for Canada in terms of
trade value with France since the majority of Canadian asbes-
tos is exported to Asia, Morocco, Tunisia and Alergia."8 The
loss of French trade is not crucial to the industry. There are
only 2,000 jobs or so at stake." It is unclear whether or not
the result would be the same in a controversial case where the
measure at issue was akin to that in either the Tuna-Dolphin
or Shrimp-Turtle disputes, where the measure was trying to
save animal life and to conserve the environment but the eco-
243. Id. at 378.
244. See Discussion infra Part I, at 6 (especially notes 24-27).
245. Laurie Kazan-Allen, The WTO Speaks: Chrysotile is Bad for You! BRITISH
ASBESTOS NEWSLETTER, Issue 39 (Summer 2000),
httpj/ww.lkaz.demon.co.uk/ban39.htm.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Kazan-Allen, supra note 246.
249. Id. However, what is crucial is the possibility that developing nations
might adopt similar prohibitions as Asian countries buy 65% of Canadian
chrysotile and Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria are also good customers. In these
countries, uncontrolled use is the norm.
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nomic efficiency at risk was great because the fishing indus-
tries have a high trade value.
Last, it is possible that the "normative universal morality
of right and wrong" from the "Liberalism Model" ° influenced
the panel, whereas this notion has not seemed to affect deci-
sions preceding the Asbestos Report. Specifically, perhaps it
was the toxicity of asbestos and its proven, deadly harm to
humans that fueled the decision and not legal doctrine. It
seems that if the panel had followed prior interpretations of
Article XX(b) of the GATT, then the case may have come out
differently because the reading of "necessary" was relatively
narrow in those past interpretations. Under prior interpreta-
tions of those standards, it seems probable that controlled use
of asbestos would have been appraised as the "least-trade-re-
strictive-alternative," because controlled use would have signif-
icantly reduced the harm of asbestos on French citizens, albeit
not in total. Although what is "right" or "equitable" is less
controversial in the asbestos case as asbestos is a clear killer of
humans and the trade value at issue was low, there may not
be such an overwhelming consensus regarding environmental
causes, or even human health issues where the evidence is less
overwhelming.2
1
V. CONCLUSION
Canada has appealed the panel decision to the AB, which
is expected to issue .its ruling in early March, 2001.1 2 This
author suspects that the AB will affirm the ruling of the panel,
perhaps not on the exact same grounds but for the same rea-
sons-namely, the indisputable evidence against the use of
asbestos in France. Only in future cases, however, will we
250. Dailey, supra note 9.
251. See Winestock, supra note 6 (discussing how insignificant the trade loss to
Canada is as the asbestos industry in Canada only employs 2,000 or so Quebec
residents).
252. Daniel Pruzin, International Agreements: EU, Chile Announce Deal in Dis-
pute Over Fishing Vessels Catching Swordfish, BNA INTL TRADE DAILY, Jan. 29,
2001, http/lwww.lexis.com. The WTO's Appellate Body decided on Dec. 20, 2000 to
defer its decision well beyond the allowable 30-day extension the circulation of
reports citing "exceptional workload" and further said that the reports will be
circulated no later than March 12, 2001. See Ravi Kanth, Dispute Settlement: WTO
Appellate Body Delays Decisions in Asbestos, Steel Dumping Disputes, BNA INVL
TRADE DAILY, Jan. 9, 2001, http:J/www.lexis.com.
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learn if the Asbestos Report will have an impact on environ-
mental and health regulations. One concerned scholar, Sam
Zia Zarifi, commented that "the Asbestos dispute... potential-
ly constitutes the most significant expansion of the WTO's
reach into areas of human health and worker safety once ex-
clusively reserved for sovereign States." 3 Despite this con-
cern for state sovereignty, however, this case seems to be a
step in the right direction even though it may not translate to
environmental disputes or to health cases which are less egre-
gious or well documented.
Moreover, interestingly, since Canada placed its appeal
with the AB, the AB decided on November 23, 2000 to accept
"amicus curiae" briefs in the Asbestos appeal.' The AB first
"opened the door" to amicus briefs in the Shrimp-Turtle AB
ruling when it found that panels have the discretion to seek,
accept, or deny information presented by NGOs as part of the
comprehensive nature of their authority, reversing the panel's
finding that such submissions were not allowed in the WTO.
Until the Asbestos dispute, no procedure has been established
for determining when and how such submissions should be
made or acceptedY5 Nevertheless, despite these progresses in
WTO/GATT dispute settlement, the WTO still has a long way
253. Kazan-Allen, supra note 245.
254. Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Appellate Body Under Fire for Move on Accep-
tance of Amicus Briefs, BNA INTL TRADE DAILY, Nov. 27, 2000,
http'//www.lexis.com.
255. Shrimp-Turtle AB, supra note 4, at V; Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Appel-
late Body Under Fire for Move on Acceptance of Amicus Briefs, BNA INT'L TRADE
DAILY, Nov. 27, 2000, http'//www.lexis.com. AB chairman Florentino Feliciano said
the decision was made "in the interest of fairness and orderly procedure in the
conduct of this appeal . . . for the purposes of this appeal only . . . and is not a
new working procedure drawn up by the Appellate Body." Id. Thus far, 5 NGO
briefs have been rejected by the AB without reason. Id. For an interesting com-
mentary on the role of NGOs in GATT/WTO dispute resolution, see Weiler, supra
note 38, at IV:4, 3 (2000) (arguing that opening up dispute resolution to NGOs
could skew the system considerably in favor of Western developed countries, espe-
cially Northern American, but grants that for lawyers and judges, who wish to
guarantee the integrity of a legal process, "the notion of excluding voices affected
by one's decision and not hearing arguments by then run counter not only to the
ethic of open and public process but to the very principles of natural justice.") See
also McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 234, at 571-572 (arguing that the WTO
should not allow NGOs a direct role in the dispute settlement process because
such groups are sometimes unaccountable even to their own membership and
would give special interest groups, including protectionist groups, too great a mea-
sure of influence in policy-making).
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to go before it can claim to be "greening" itself.
Future panels can ameliorate, although probably not oblit-
erate, 6 the trade-versus-environment conflict by relying
more heavily on the WTO's Preamble. Specifically, panels
should adhere to the "sustainable development" principle and
try to balance the "Liberalism Model" (seeking to lower trade
policies to the extent that they do not violate environmental
and human welfare domestic social policies) with the "Econom-
ic Efficiency Model"(seeking to reduce trade barriers to create
wealth which in turn can be used to conserve the environment
and improve the lives of the world population.) Furthermore,
as Virginia Dailey suggests, future panels should incorporate
the "sustainable development" principle, as a rule of customary
international law, into the balancing test of Article XX's cha-
peau. 7 This would accomplish more of a binding obligation
on the part of Members not to violate customary international
law which is binding even for non-signatories. Moreover, incor-
porating "sustainable development" into customary interna-
tional law would place a mandatory obligation on panels and
on the AB to decide disputes in harmony with the principle.
In addition to relying more heavily on the "sustainable
development" principle in the WTO's Preamble, future panels
should apply the Asbestos Report's "sufficiently effective" stan-
dard stringently. Specifically, panels and the AB should refine
this newfound standard so that alternative measures need not
be resorted to under the "necessary" interpretation unless they
are almost equally as effective as the measure at issue. (Em-
phasis supplied) Only then will measures that are truly "neces-
sary" to effect a particular health or environmental measure be
permissible under the GATT 1994, even though they may not
be economically efficient.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
On March 12, 2001, the AB affirmed the decision of the
Dispute Panel in its report ("Asbestos AB"). In its ruling, the
AB seems to answer the question lurking in the Panel's ruling:
256. See Dillon, supra note 1, at 381-82, n. 55 (arguing that the GATT cannot
accommodate the goals of free trade and the environment).
257. Daily, supra note 9. Of course, this vague term would have to be further
and more clearly defined before incorporating it into customary international law.
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Whether the Asbestos dispute can be used in future disputes to
"green" WTO/GATT jurisprudence, or whether the rationale of
the ruling will be limited to its facts due to the unique nature
of the health measure at issue. The AB's logic in this dispute
suggests the answer to be the latter contention. Because the
AB relies heavily on the unique toxic nature of asbestos and
not generally on health and environmental concerns, Asbestos
AB almost invites future arbiters to confine its reasoning to its
facts.
The issues raised on appeal include: (1) whether the Panel
erred in finding that the French Decree violated the "national
treatment" principle in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 due to a
misinterpretation and application of "like products" with re-
spect to the Canadian asbestos and the substitute products
used in France and (2) whether the Panel erred in finding that
the Decree was "necessary to protect human... life or health"
under Article XX(b).s Regarding the "like products" issue,
the AB overruled the dispute panel's finding that the French
measure violated the "national treatment" principle."9 In-
stead, the AB found that the Canadian chrysotile asbestos
fibres and the asbestos substitute products used in France
(polyvinyl alcohol and cellulose and glass fibres), and similarly
the Canadian chrysotile-cement products and the substitute
product used in France, fibro-cement, were not "like products"
under Article III:4. s The AB reasoned that health risk fac-
tors relating to a product, although just one of many consider-
ations, "may" be taken into account in the inquiry.26' In this
case, the AB ruled that the health risk of asbestos should be
part of the inquiry as "carcinogenicity, or toxicity, constitutes,
as we see it, a defining aspect of the physical properties of
258. WTO Dispute Settlement Appellate Body Report on European Communi-
ties-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) at IV, para. 58,
http'//www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-edispuel35abr-e.pdf [hereinafter Asbestos AB].
259. Id. For further discussion of the dispute panel's finding under Article III:4,
see Discussion infra Part III.C, and supra note 194, at 33.
260. Asbestos AB, supra note 258, at VI.D, paras. 125, 131, 148.
261. Id. at VI.D, paras. 113-114. "We do not, however, consider that the evi-
dence relating to the health risks associated with chrysotile asbestos fibres need
be examined under a separate criterion, because we believe that this evidence can
be evaluated under the existing criteria of physical properties, and of consumers'
tastes and habits." Id. (Emphasis in original)
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chrysotile asbestos fibres."262 Moreover, the AB stated that a
consideration of health risks under a "like products" analysis
would not nullify the need for Article XX(b). The AB reasoned:
"The fact that an interpretation of Article III:4, under those
rules, implies a less frequent recourse to Article XX(b) does not
deprive the exception in Article XX(b) of effet utile."263
The AB's ruling on the scope of a "like products" analysis
would seem to make it easier for a ban on a product to survive
scrutiny.2" In effect, this ruling gives health legislators two
bites at the apple: If a Member cannot knock out a complaint
by inserting Article XX(b) considerations into a "like products"
analysis, then the Member still has a second defense under
Article XX(b). However, the AB's choice of the word "may"
instead of "must" with respect to including considerations of
health risks into a "like products" analysis is telling. This
subtle yet key distinction in word choice could be seized in
future disputes to confine the Asbestos AB's inclusion of health
risk factors to the facts of that unique case where "the scientif-
ic evidence of record for th[e] finding of carcinogenicity of
chrysotile asbestos fibres is so clear, voluminous, and is con-
firmed, a number of times, by a variety of international organi-
zations, as to be practically overwhelming."265 Similarly, a
concurring member noted that although he or she would in
this case accord dispositive weight to the health risk factor
under a "like products" analysis due to the "undisputed deadly
nature of chrysotile asbestos fibres," he or she would limit this
holding to this particular case.266 This sentiment too implies
that the result in this case will not necessarily dictate results
in future Article XX(b) disputes.
With respect to the second issue, "necessity" under Article
XX(b), the AB disagreed with Canada's contention that
chrysotile asbestos does not pose a significant risk to human
life or health, due to the overwhelming scientific evidence.267
Similarly, the AB disagreed with Canada's contention that the
level of protection of health envisioned by the Decree does not
262. Id. at VI.D, para. 114.
263. Id. at V.D, para. 115.
264. Id. at VI.D, para. 115.
265. Asbestos A.B., supra note 258 at VI.E, para. 151.
266. Id., at VI.E, paras. 152-53.
267. Id. at VII.B, para. 166.
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in fact constitute a halt to the spread of asbestos-related risks,
since risks still exist with the substitute products." Instead,
the AB affirmed that a Member may ban one product and
utilize another with less risk, although the exact degree of risk
is unknown. The Report states, "it seems to us perfectly legiti-
mate for a Member to seek to halt the spread of a highly risky
product while allowing the use of a less risky product in its
place."269
Finally, the AB disagreed with Canada's claim that the
Panel erred in finding that "controlled use" is not a reasonably
available alternative to the Decree.7 However, the AB
reached this conclusion by slightly different reasoning than the
Dispute Panel, which seems to forecast that the Asbestos dis-
pute will come to be an anomaly in WTO/GATT Article XX(b)
jurisprudence. Quoting from a recently decided case that ad-
dressed the issue of "necessity" under Article XX(d) of the
GATT 1994, the AB stated that "one aspect of the 'weighing
and balancing process... comprehended in the determination
of an inquiry into whether a WTO-consistent alternative
measure' is reasonably available is the extent to which the
alternative measure 'contributes to the realization of the end
pursued."27' Moreover the AB stated, "[tihe more vital or
important [the] common interests or values pursued, the easier
it would be to accept as 'necessary' measures designed to
achieve those ends (the "necessity scale")."272 Under this anal-
ysis, the AB found that the French value pursued is "both vital
and important in the highest degree."27' Next the AB framed
the question as "whether there is an alternative measure that
would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade
than a prohibition."274 The AB answered the question in the
negative, stating that there was no alternative that could allow
France to achieve its chosen level of health protection by halt-
268. Id. at VII.B, para. 165.
269. Id. at. VII.B, para. 168.
270. Id. at VII.B, para. 165.
271. Asbestos AB, supra note 258, at V[I.B, para. 172 (quoting Appellate Body
Report, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products,
WT/DS98/AB/R (Jan. 12, 2000) at paras. 162-163, 166).
272. Id. at VII.B, para. 172 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea-Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (Jan. 12,
2000) at paras. 162-163, 166).
273. Id. at VII.B, para. 172.
274. Id. at VII.B, para. 172. (emphasis added).
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ing the spread of asbestos-related health risks. 5
Although the AB reached the proper result in the author's
view with respect to finding that the Decree was "necessary"
and that there was no "less-trade-restrictive-alternative," the
AB's "necessity scale" is problematic. Under this scale, the AB
states that as the "vitality or importance" of the Member's
value in policy rises the difficulty in sustaining a necessity
finding correspondingly decreases. But who will make these
value judgments as to whether or not a Member's health or
environmental policy is "important"? The faceless members of
the dispute panel or of the AB? Or the Members creating the
legislation? If it is the former, than less universally popular
values-like maintaining biodiversity and other pro-environ-
mental policies-may be given short shrift because panelists do
not assess those values as being "vital or important common
interests or values." If the Dispute Panel and AB in this case
were driven by moral or equitable concerns under the "Liberal-
ism Model" because the issue posed grave danger to human
health, perhaps they may not be so forgiving if the "health" or
"life" at stake is "animal" or if the purpose is environmental
conservation. Also, in disputes where the product at issue has
a higher trade value than the relatively low value of asbestos,
perhaps panelists will perceive the "value" of the health or
environmental measure as less important by contrast and
therefore make it more difficult for a Member to satisfy the
"necessary" standard in Article XX(b).
In addition to the problem of scales and value judgements,
there also is a problem with some of the AB's contradictory or,
at best, vague language. The AB framed the inquiry of a "rea-
sonable alternative" as not just whether an alternative would
be "sufficiently effective" as the Dispute Panel held in the
Asbestos Report, but goes even further by framing that ques-
tion in terms of whether an alternative measure can achieve
the same end. It is unclear whether the AB is raising the stan-
dard from "sufficiently effective" to the "same" level of effec-
tiveness, or if it is only doing so in the context of disputes
where the panelists consider the "values" pursued to be "both
vital and important." Similarly, the standard the AB borrowed
from another case--"the extent to which the alternative mea-
275. Id. at VII.B, para. 174.
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sure 'contributes to the realization of the end pursued"--is
equally opaque. Moreover, the language seems contradictory to
the "same" standard. In any event, although environmentalists
and health observers can welcome the result in this case, they
should be aware that winning this dispute does not ensure
victory in future Article XX(b) disputes since the logic in the
Asbestos AB and to a lesser extent the Asbestos Report seems
tailored for the unique facts of this dispute.
Julie H. Paltrowitz"
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